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I.

Introduction: “Climate risk is investment risk.” The statement applies to
asset managers, whether the investment is money or land.

“Climate risk is investment risk,” announced Larry Fink in a letter to CEOs this
January.1 Mr. Fink is the Founder, Chairman and CEO of BlackRock, the largest
* J.D., LLM, Wallace Stegner Center Legal Fellow, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University
of Utah.
** J.D. M.S., Professor of Law (Research) and Wallace Stegner Center Legal Fellow, S.J. Quinney
College of Law at the University of Utah.
*** J.D., Vice President, Public Lands and Senior Policy Counsel, National Audubon Society.
Thank you to Ryan Lolar for his careful review and thoughtful comments on drafts of this paper,
and to the Wilburforce Foundation for supporting this research effort. The Wilburforce Foundation
did not review any aspect of this Article prior to publication or otherwise exercise editorial control.
The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the state of Utah, the University
of Utah, or project funders.
1

Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEO’s: A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance,
Blackrock (2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter
(last visited June 9, 2020) [hereinafter Blackrock Annual Letter to CEOs].
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money-management firm in the world with more than $6 trillion in assets under
management.2 Each year, Mr. Fink sends a letter to CEOs signaling BlackRock’s
investment priorities. This year Mr. Fink warned companies that climate change is
“driving a profound reassessment of risk and asset values.”3 He reminded CEOs that
he has a duty to manage assets according to the priorities of his clients, most of whom
seek a sustained yield with multi-generational investment horizon. Mindful of these
priorities, and the threat climate change poses to these objectives, Mr. Fink demanded
more robust climate change disclosures from companies seeking access to BlackRock’s
very deep pockets.4 Mr. Fink demanded this information because he recognized that
“business as usual” is not good business in light of the challenges and risks presented
by climate change.5
The hotter the world gets, the graver the forecasted consequences. Observed
warming trends reinforce the importance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C to avoid
catastrophic effects and reduce the severity of unavoidable changes.6 To achieve this
result, the International Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) identifies a reduction target
for global net anthropogenic carbon emissions of 45 percent by 2030 and a net zero

2

Larry Fink has been named one of the “World’s Greatest Leaders by Fortune. See
https://fortune.com/worlds-greatest-leaders/2018/larry-fink/. Barrons has named him one of the
“World’s Best CEOs for 13 consecutive years. https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/aboutus/leadership/larry-fink.
3
Blackrock Annual Letter to CEOs supra note 1.
4
Id.; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, “BlackRock C.E.O. Larry Fink: Climate Crisis will Reshape
Finance,” NEW YORK TIMEs (Jan. 14, 2020).
5
Mr. Fink is not alone. The American Bar Association’s House of Delegates unanimously adopted
a resolution in August 2019 urging every level of government and the private sector to “recognize
their obligation to address climate change” and instructing all lawyers “to advise their clients of the
risks and opportunities that climate change provides.” AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 111 (ADOPTED AUGUST 12-13, 2019). available at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/annual-2019/111-annual2019.pdf; John R. Nolon, Feature Land Use Strategies that Mitigate Climate Change 34 Probate
and Property 34 (Jan. 2020).
6
See generally IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policy Makers in Global Warming of 1.5°C An IPCC
Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related
global greenhouse gas emission pathways in the context of strengthening the global response to the
threat of climate change, sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty [hereinafter
IPCC 1.5° Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers].
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target by 2050 in order to limit warming to a (hopefully) manageable level.7 At this
late stage in the game, the equation is simple. Higher greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emission trajectories lead to higher forecasted global warming with graver
environmental and security consequences.8 In other words, high emissions result in
high risk. Failing to reduce GHG emissions is a risk management failure.9
Like Mr. Fink, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) is also an asset
manager. The BLM manages more than 255.8 million acres of public land and most
of the federal government’s mineral state (over 700 million acres).10 Congress
instructed the BLM to manage these assets for sustained yield with a multi-generational
investment horizon—priorities very similar to Mr. Fink’s clients.11 Unlike Mr. Fink,
the BLM’s current management priorities do not recognize that “climate risk is
investment risk.”
The BLM has authority over a significant portion of national GHG emissions.
Emissions from fossil fuels produced on federal land averaged almost 24 percent of
national CO2 emissions and over 7 percent of methane emissions for the past ten
years.12 Instead of following the global trend of mitigating the effects of climate
7

Id. at 14.
The National Security, Military, and Intelligence Panel on Climate Change (NSMIP), A Security
Threat Assessment of Global Climate Change 6 (Feb. 2020) [hereinafter NSMIP, A Security Threat
Assessment of Global Climate Change] (“Higher levels of warming will pose catastrophic, and
likely irreversible global security risks over the course of the 21st century.”).
9
Id. at 12 (“If we collectively turn our backs on these threats, we stand on the precipice of some of
the greatest, multi-dimensional security threats the world has ever seen.”).
10
Carol Vincent et al., Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data (Congressional Research
Service 2017), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf; Karin P. Sheldon, Pamela
Baldwin, Areas of Critical Environmental Concern: FLPMA’s Unfulfilled Conservation Mandate,
28 COLO. NAT. RES. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 10 (WINTER 2017).
11
This argument is more fully developed in Section III.A. See also Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands
and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal Energy Leasing, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
1, 4 (2018) (noting that many externalities are unaccounted for in federal fossil fuel mineral
development even though “a well-run business would not give away its assets for a fraction of their
true value nor allow outside actors to impose uncompensated costs on the bottom line”). This
argument is more fully developed in Section III.A.
12
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERV., FEDERAL LANDS GREENHOUSE GAS AND SEQUESTRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES:
ESTIMATES FOR 2005 - 2014 at 1, 8 (2018) available at
https://doi.org/10.3133/sir20185131 [hereinafter USGS FEDERAL LANDS GHG REPORT 2014]. See
also U.S. Dept. of Int., BLM, New Mexico State Office, Cumulative BLM New Mexico Greenhouse
8
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change by avoiding, minimizing, and offsetting GHG emissions, the BLM is increasing
fossil fuel production on federal lands and eliminating requirements that previously
minimized GHG emissions during the extraction process.13 Everything else held
constant, more fossil fuel production obviously results in more GHG emissions, unless
some sort of offsetting program is implemented. Increasing GHGs in the atmosphere
exacerbates the effects of climate change, with potentially disastrous effects for BLMmanaged landscapes and for humanity in general.
The purpose of this article is two-fold. First, the article argues that the BLM
has a statutory duty to respond to climate change, which includes the duty to avoid
exacerbating climate change. Second, it seeks to move the legal discussion from
aspiration to action by proposing a legal strategy, using the existing legal framework,
by which the BLM can achieve net zero emissions from all new mineral development
activity. While the article focuses on oil and gas development, the same methodology
could be applied to coal mining, tar sands, and other sources of GHG emissions.
Section I (this section) provides an introduction. Section II discusses climate science
and the BLM’s authority over nationally significant emissions that contribute to
exacerbating climate change. Section III argues that without incorporating climate
science into its land management decisions, the BLM cannot fulfill its statutory duties
under the Federal Land Management Policy Act or its legal responsibility to avoid
arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Section IV turns to the National Environmental Policy Act, arguing that its procedural
requirements also require the BLM to take a “hard look” at the cumulative effects of
climate change, risks associated with exacerbating climate change through seemingly
Gas Emissions: A Supplemental White Paper, 18 (2019) (summarizing results of national
inventory).
13
See, e.g., Statement of Michael Need, Deputy Director, Operations BLM US Department of the
Interior before the House Committee on Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral
Resources Oversight on “Examining the Policies and Priorities of the Bureau of Land Management,
the U.S. Forest Service, and the Power Marketing Administrations (Mar. 12, 2019) (emphasizing
BLM efforts to promote and permit fossil fuel energy production, including internal department
directives limiting and constricting environmental review under NEPA as well as Solicitor Order
directing BLM to “promote the exploration and development of Federal onshore oil and gas and
solid mineral reserves.”). See also Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence
and Economic Growth, Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16, 093 (Mar. 31, 2017) (rescinding
Executive Orders and Plans related to responding to climate change and instructing all agencies to
“suspend, revise, or rescind” agency actions arising from instructions related to addressing climate
change) [hereinafter E.O. 13783, Energy Independence].
20201205 Draft
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de minimis contributions, and forecasted ecological trends caused by climate change.
Section V argues that the BLM should develop a comprehensive GHG mitigation plan
for its oil and gas permitting decisions, including the adoption of a net zero requirement
for all new oil and gas development activity. Section VI suggests ways to incorporate
GHG mitigation at each stage of the oil and gas development process using the existing
legal structure. Section VII concludes by arguing that a net zero requirement on all
new oil and gas development activity is reasonable and has precedent.
Admittedly, even if fully implemented this proposal would only result in a
fraction of the necessary reductions that must be taken in accordance with the IPCC’s
latest guidance. However, even grand journeys are composed of individual steps, and
it is time for the BLM to take a step in the right direction.
II.

Climate Science and the BLM’s Contribution to Climate Change.

The days of debating whether climate change is real have long since passed.
Even the fossil fuel industry now recognizes that human activity contributes to our
changing climate.14 The BLM is the largest landowner in the United States and is
responsible for managing all federally owned onshore minerals. The BLM has pursued
this role with zeal, encouraging expansive oil, natural gas, and coal development.
Though at one time this strategy arguably served the national interest, those interests
have changed. With climate change presenting increasingly dire consequences each
day, the continued push for fossil fuel development does not take into account the longterm environmental needs of future generations.15 Instead, of benefiting the national
interest, a permitting process that exacerbates climate change poses an existential threat
to the national interest.

14

Maria L. Banda, Climate Science in the Courts: A Review of U.S. and International Judicial
Pronouncements, Environmental Law Institute 2 (April 2020) [hereinafter Banda, Climate Science
in the Courts] (noting that the existence of climate change and that human activity exacerbates
climate change are no longer disputed by the federal government or industry litigants).
15
43 U.S.C. ¶ 1702(c) (defining “multiple use” to require a “combination of balanced and diverse
resources uses that takes into account the long-term needs of future generations”).
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A.

Climate change is happening faster than anticipated and
increasing GHG emissions will only exacerbate the risks of climate
change.

The World Economic Forum opened the 2020 Global Risks Report with a
sobering observation: Climate change is “striking harder and more rapidly than many
expected.”16 In 2017, the Climate Science Special Report summarized “thousands of
studies conducted by tens of thousands of scientists around the world” documenting
changes in global temperatures, changes in rainfall patterns, disappearing snow cover,
increasing incidents of drought, changing storm patterns, and an increase in
atmospheric water vapor.17 Recently, other scientists have documented a connection
between the increase in atmospheric water vapor and the frequency of more extreme
weather events including stronger hurricanes.18 “Evidence for a changing climate
abounds, from the top of the atmosphere to the depths of the oceans.”19 The
unanticipated speed of these global changes prompted the IPCC to issue a special report
in 2019, clarifying the importance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C.20 “Limits to
adaptive capacity exist at 1.5° C of warming, [and] become more pronounced at higher
levels of warming.”21
Concern over exceeding 1.5°C of warming is not limited to investors and
scientists—national security experts also see risks. According to a recent report issued
by the non-partisan National Security, Military, and Intelligence Panel on Climate
Change, the medium-long term scenario for warming between 2°C to 4°C presents “a
16

WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2020 available at
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2020 [hereinafter WEF, Global Risks
Report 2020] at 33.
17
U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2017: Climate Science Special Report, Volume I 36
available
at
https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf
[hereinafter NCA4 Vol. 1, Climate Science Special Report]; see also Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation
in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II: Report in Brief available at
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads [hereinafter NCA4 Vol 2, Climate Science Report in
Brief] The report in Volume II, first published in 2018 and revised in June 2019, is the most recent
formal summary of the best available science regarding observed and forecasted changes.
18
Union of Concerned Scientists, Hurricanes and Climate Change (June 25, 2019) at
https://ucsusa.org/resources/hurricanes-and-climate-change.
19
NCA4 Vol. 1, Climate Science Special Report supra note 17 at 36.
20
IPCC 1.5° Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9.
21
Id. at 10, ¶ B.6.3.
20201205 Draft
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potentially unmanageable, ‘very high-catastrophic’ global security threat—such that
this scenario must be avoided unequivocally.”22 The report characterized climate
change as a “threat multiplier.”23 Changing climate conditions (causing food
insecurity, water scarcity, loss of rural livelihoods, and extreme weather) accelerate
existing social tensions (like migration, disease, state fragility, conflict, and increased
social violence), resulting in intensified national security risks.24 Without mincing
words, the report characterized the risks of unabated climate change as “very high” and
“catastrophic.”25 “If allowed to reach levels that scientific models anticipate, climate
change will wreak havoc on the security of our nation, and indeed all regions of the
globe.”26 The report also concluded that existing policies to address climate change
are insufficient to keep warming below 1.5°C, and that current emission trajectories
will blow past the 2°C mark by mid-century and could reach a disastrous 4°C by the
end of the century.27
Scientific consensus agrees that human activities have already caused
approximately 1.0°C of global warming.28 Impacts on natural and human systems from
22

NSMIP, A Security Threat Assessment of Global Climate Change supra note 8 at 9.
Id. at 18.
24
See, e.g. id. at 18-29 (“First, the sudden shifts in regional climate and weather patterns increased
localized physical shocks, causing new constraints in resources and making natural disasters more
frequent and intense in communities across the world. Then, as human systems are disturbed by
shocks to local environments, second-order effects creating new migration patterns and community
fragility can create or exacerbate social tensions at the state and regional levels. This increased
regional friction may threaten new territorial disputes, conflicts, trade and economic shocks, and
harmful unilateral actions.”); id. at 16-23 (summarizing regional and intersecting climate security
threats for each area of the globe in short- and long-term scenarios).
25
Id. at 8 (defining “very high” to mean “severe and systemic risk to human and social security
systems” and “catastrophic” to mean “disastrous and irreversible risk to human social and security
systems).
26
Id. at 12.
27
Id. at 7 (“Even if all existing climate policies are implemented, we are on track to increase global
temperatures by as high as 3.2°C . . . by the end of the century. . . . On current emissions trajectories,
global warming levels could reach 2°C . . . as soon as mid-century and 4°C . . . as soon as the end
of the century.”).
28
IPCC 1.5° Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at 4, ¶ A.1; see also WORLD
METEOROLOGICAL ORG., WMO STATEMENT ON THE STATE OF THE GLOBAL CLIMATE IN 2019 at 3
(2019) available at https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=10211 (last visited April 30,
2020) (“The year 2019 ended with a global average temperature of 1.1°C above estimated preindustrial averages, second only to the record set in 2016.”).
23
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global warming have already been observed.29 Allowing global warming to exceed
1.5°C will likely have irreversible impacts on people and species, including the loss of
entire ecosystems.30 Future climate related risks “depend on the rate, peak, and
duration of warming.”31 In other words, reaching and sustaining net zero GHG
emissions earlier, reduces risks.32 Delay in reducing GHG emissions (our current
trajectory) exacerbates risks.
A change in the composition of the atmosphere caused this change.33 Excess
GHGs have compromised the atmosphere’s ability to provide a stable climate that
functions consistent with historic conditions. As a result, the functionality of the
atmosphere has been degraded. For hundreds of thousands of years—during the
entirety of human civilization as we know it—the average carbon concentration in the
atmosphere fluctuated between 180 and 280 parts per million (ppm).34 With the
industrial revolution, the average concentration began increasing.35 Between 1958 and
2019, the average annual CO2 concentration skyrocketed from 315 ppm to over 400
ppm.36 According to the EPA, the concentration of CO2 has increased 46 percent over
pre-industrial levels, while the concentration of methane has increased 165 percent
during this period.37 These and other heat trapping gasses, (like nitrous oxide, and
fluorinated gases) increased average global temperatures—a gradual shift upward that
29

IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at 5, ¶ A.3.1
Id. at 5, ¶ A.3.1.
31
Id. at 5, ¶ A.3.2
32
Id. at 5, ¶ A.2.2.
33
U.S. EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990-2018, Executive
Summary ES-2 (2020) available at https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhousegas-emissions-and-sinks-1990-2018 [hereinafter US EPA GHG Inventory 2018].
34
NCA4 Vol.. 1, Climate Science Special Report supra note 17 at 82.
35
NOAA Global Monitoring Division, CO2 at NOAA’s Mauna Loa Observatory Reaches New
Milestone:
Tops
400
ppm
(May
10,
2013)
available
at
https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/news/7074.html (reporting milestone of exceeding daily mean of
400 ppm);
36
NOAA, Global Carbon Dioxide Growth in 2018 Reached 4th Highest on Record (March 22, 2019)
available at https://www.noaa.gov/news/global-carbon-dioxide-growth-in-2018-reached-4thhighest-on-record (last visited April 29, 2020). NOAA Global Monitoring Division, CO2 at NOAA’s
Mauna Loa Observatory Reaches New Milestone: Tops 400 ppm (May 10, 2013) available at
https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/news/7074.html (reporting milestone of exceeding daily mean of
400 ppm);
37
Id.
30
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occurred consistent with scientific forecasts.38 The observed warming trend leaves no
tolerance for arguments denying the anthropogenic influence on climate change. As
the Fourth National Assessment summarized, “there are no credible alternative human
or natural explanations supported by the observational evidence.”39
Limiting global warming requires adhering to a carbon budget that is being
rapidly depleted.40 The global average temperature will continue to rise until
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 (and other GHGs) stabilize—in other words, until
global GHG concentrations stop increasing.41 The level of risk imposed on the world
depends on how high the global average temperature rises.42 Science advisors on the
IPCC attempt to quantify risk scenarios by associating atmospheric concentrations with
different levels of warming—450 ppm for 2°C of warming and 430 ppm for 1.5°C of
warming.43 But global warming does not offer a selection of items that can be ordered
from a catalogue to fit our budgets and tastes. Since 2007, world leaders have roughly
targeted 2°C of warming as the “safe” upper limit of a new normal.44 That
38

IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at ¶ A.1.1; see also NCA4
Vol. 1, Climate Science Special Report supra note 17 at 31
39
NCA4 Vol. 2, Climate Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 35 (“Current and future
greenhouse gas emissions, and thus mitigation actions to reduce emissions, will largely determine
future climate change impacts and risks to society.”).
40
IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at 12 ¶ C.1.3 (“Limiting
global warming requires . . . staying within a total carbon budget. By the end of 2017, anthropogenic
CO2 emissions since the pre-industrial period are estimated to have reduced the total carbon budget
for 1.5°C by approximately 2200 +/- 320 GtCO2 (medium confidence). The associated remaining
budget is being depleted by current emissions of 42 +/- 3 GtCO2 per year (high confidence).”).
41
IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at 12, ¶C.1.3. (“Limiting
global warming requires limiting the total cumulative global anthropogenic emissions of CO2”); see
also US EPA GHG Inventory 2018 supra note 34 at ES-1 (noting that in 1992, the United States
signed and ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change with a goal of
“stabilization of greenhouse concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”).
42
IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at ¶ A.3.2.
43
This statement is obviously oversimplified. The emissions scenarios evaluated by the IPCC are
far more complex. Nevertheless, the concept remains the same. See, e.g., IPCC, Climate Change
2014: Synthesis Report: Summary for Policy Makers: Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) [hereinafter
IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report] at 20-21; see also IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy
Makers supra note 9 at 12, ¶ C.1.3 (outlining budget scenarios for limiting warming to 1.5°C).
44
For example, in the 2010 Cancun Agreements to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, the signatories agreed that to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference” with
20201205 Draft
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characterization of “safe” came with caveats. Those caveats included lethal heat
waves, desertification, forest and crop failures, shrinking snow packs, rising sea levels,
intensified storms, warming oceans, melting permafrost, widespread species
extinctions, extreme drought, ecological disruption, and potential tipping points—none
of which sound safe.45 The characterization of “safe” was also a best guess. No one
has ever shifted the mean global temperature upward before. No one can be sure how
the world’s climate and ecological system would react. Changing the atmospheric
composition is an unprotected experiment filled with uncertainties and risks.46

the atmosphere, they must “hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C above preindustrial levels.” U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Cancun Agreements:
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Under the
Convention, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/Add.1, Dec. 1/CP.16 p.4 (Mar. 11, 2011). The more recent
Paris Agreement showed slightly more caution, committing the parties to hold the increase to “well
below” 2°C. See Paris Agreement to U.M. Framework Convention on Climate change, opened for
signature Apr. 22, 2016, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, art.2 (entered into force Nov. 4,
2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
45
See generally, Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC,
Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Fields et al eds., 2014). For similar
information with fewer words but more opinion and emotion, see Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s
Terrifying New Math, Rolling Stone (July 19, 2012).
46
Any data informed decision-making process risks two types of error, Type I error and Type II
error. A Type I error occurs when a decision maker chooses a course of action based on a projected
outcome when the projected outcome is not correct, whereas Type II error occurs when a decision
maker rejects the possibility of a projected outcome and the projected outcome turns out to be
correct. In the context of climate change, a Type I error would arise where the BLM took a course
of action because of projected climate impacts when those impacts failed to come to fruition. For
example, the BLM anticipated reduced water availability due to lower snowpack and increased rains
compensated for the lighter snowpack. A Type II error then is when the BLM decides a course of
action but fails to take account of climate change impacts when making that decision. For example,
the BLM relied upon historic data for water availability without considering the forecasted shortage.
Ryan P. Kelly, et al., Science, Policy, and Data-Driven Decisions in a Data Vacuum, 44 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 7 (2017); Berry J. Brosi & Eric G. Biber, Statistical Inference, Type II error, and decision
making under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 7 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(2008).
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“Potential surprises” is how the Fourth National Assessment characterizes
some of the risks.47 “The more the climate changes, the greater potential for these
surprises.”48 First, there is a risk that the models are underestimating the warming
potential of different emission scenarios.49 Currently, observed effects are occurring
faster than the models predicted, which indicates that the models may be
conservative.50 For example, polar ice is melting faster than the models predicted,
driven partially by sea level temperatures rising more quickly than the models
anticipated, indicating that the deleterious effects may occur sooner or more intensely
than previously imagined.51
Second, there is a risk that warming will happen too quickly for ecological
systems that support human existence to adapt. As one economic report recently
summarized, “Climate change is shifting ecosystems and destroying forms of natural
capital such as glaciers, forests, and ocean ecosystems, which provide important
services to human communities. This in turn imperils the human habitat and economic
activity.”52 To date, observed changes include melting glaciers that affect water
47

NCA4, Vol 2, Climate Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 57 (“Both large-scale shifts in the
climate system (sometimes called’ tipping points’) and compound extremes have the potential to
generate outcomes that are difficult to anticipate and may have high consequences.”).
48
Id.
49
NCA4 Vol. 1, Climate Science Special Report supra note 17 at 422 (“There is very high
confidence in the likelihood of the existence of positive feedbacks and tipping elements. . . . There
is very high confidence that some feedbacks can be quantified, others are known but cannot be
quantified, and others may yet exist that are currently unknown.”); see also NCA4 Vol 2, Climate
Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 66 (“[D]ue to their systematic tendency to underestimate
temperature change during past warm periods, models may be more likely to underestimate than
overestimate the long-term future change.”).
50
Id.; see also WEF, Global Risks Report 2020 supra note 18 at 30.
51
“The Greenland Ice Sheet is Melting Unusually Fast” The Economist (June 17, 2019); Naomi
Oreskes & Michael Oppenheimer Scientists Have Been Underestimating the Pace of Climate
Change,
Scientific
American
(Aug.
19,
2019)
available
at
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/scientists-have-been-underestimating-the-paceof-climate-change/ (summarizing content of book, Discerning Experts that collects data
demonstrating observational data that effects of climate change are occurring more rapidly than the
models predicted).
52
McKinsey Global Initiative, Climate Risk and Response: Physical Hazards and Socioeconomic
Impacts
15
(January
2020)
available
at
https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/sustainability/our-insights/climate-risk-and-response-physical-hazards-andsocioeconomic-impacts#.
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supplies, melting sea ice and rising sea levels, desertification and lost agricultural
capacity, changed precipitation patterns and increased flooding, stressed ecosystems
and increased fire risk, altered weather patterns and mismatched timing for ecological
events. Adapting to these changes requires time, but the effects of climate change are
happening more quickly than anticipated, which does not leave much time.
Third, there is a risk that we will encounter feedback loops or tipping points,
which could produce sudden and catastrophic harm by disrupting natural ecological
cycles.53 One example of a disruptive feedback loop appears to be happening with
forests in the western United States. Abnormally warm temperatures have enabled
widespread bark beetle infestations that have killed thousands of trees.54 Extensive
swaths of dead trees, combined with hotter summer temperatures and drier forest
conditions, increase the likelihood of catastrophic wildfire events.55 Catastrophic
wildfires emit huge amounts of carbon, further exacerbating global warming. The
ecological disruption is further amplified because where the forest once served as a
global sink, it now acts as a source of emissions.56 According to the 2014 Quadrennial
Fire Review, a strategic assessment of wildfire risks on federal lands, wildfires
currently produce about seventeen percent of the GHGs released annually in the United
States.57
Another example of a disruptive feedback loop is permafrost, which stores
large amounts of methane and carbon (significantly more than the atmosphere currently
53

NCA4 Vol. 2, Climate Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 66 (“Self-reinforcing cycles or
feedbacks within the climate system have the potential to amplify and accelerate human-induced
climate change.”).
54
David D. Breshears et al., Regional Vegetation Die-Off in Response to Global-Change-Type
Drought, 102 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 15144-15148 (2005);
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0505734102.
55
Jessica E. Halofsky et al., Changing Wildfire, Changing Forests: The Effects of Climate Change
on Fire Regimes and Vegetation in the Pacific Northwest, USA, 16 FIRE ECOLOGY 4:1 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1186/s42408-019-0062-8.
56
See Robert B. Keiter & Matthew McKinney, Public land and Resources Law in the American
West: Time for Another Comprehensive Review?, 49 ENVTL. L. 1, 19 (Winter 2019) (making the
same observation and noting that since the mid-1980s, the western wildfire season has increased by
seventy-eight days and large fires are burning much longer than before); see also NCA4 Vol. 2
Climate Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 36 (Box 1.3).
57
Booz Allen Hamilton, 2015 Quadrennial Fire Review produced on behalf of USDA Forest Service
Fire & Aviation Management and the Department of Interior Office of Wildland Fire (May 2015).
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holds). As permafrost thaws, it releases methane and carbon emissions into the
atmosphere, further exacerbating global warming.58 The permafrost holds more carbon
than has ever been released by humans.59 A sudden warming event and subsequent
carbon release could therefore be catastrophic.60 The bland language of the Fourth
National Assessment betrays the risk that it conveys. Tipping points or feedback loops
“may even shift Earth’s climate system, in part or in whole, into new states that are
very different from those experienced in the recent past.”61
Finally, the sudden transitions associated with abrupt ecological disruption
could devastate social infrastructure, threaten human lives and safety, produce
widespread environmental degradation, and undermine access to water, food, and other
key resources.62 Consistent with this risk, the National Security, Military, and
Intelligence Panel on Climate Change summarized the threat assessment of warming
above 2°C as “very likely” to include significant insecurity and destabilization. “All
regions will be exposed to potentially catastrophic levels of climate security threats,
the consequences of which could lead to a breakdown of security and civilian
infrastructure, economic and resource stability, and political institutions at a large
scale.”63
Efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change have found their way into the
courtroom. After weighing all of the evidence, recent court decisions reveal broad
judicial consensus on the causes, extent, urgency, and consequences of climate

58

NCA4 Vol. 1 Climate Science Special Report supra note 17 at 29.
Samson Reiny, NASA TV: Climate, Arctic Shifts to a Carbon Source Due to Winter Soil
Emissions (Nov. 8, 2019) available at https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2019/arctic-shifts-toa-carbon-source-due-to-winter-soil-emissions (last visited Dec. 6, 2020) (providing background and
describing results of recent study indicating that the massive amounts of carbon stored in permafrost
are being released at a faster rate than presumed in climate modeling).
60
NCA4 Vol. 1, Climate Science Special Report supra note 17 at 29, 95, 314, 417, and 419..
61
NCA4 Vol. 2, Climate Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 66.
62
WEF, Global Risks Report 2020 supra note 18 at 33-65; see generally NCA4 Vol. 2, Climate
Science Report in Brief supra note 17 (listing risks to infrastructure, human safety, water quality
and supply, forests and other ecosystem health, pressures on wildlife and threats of extinction,
disruption to agriculture and food supplies, etc.).
63
NSMIP, A Security Threat Assessment supra note 11 at 9.
59
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change.64 As the Ninth Circuit summarized, “Copious expert evidence establishes . . .
[that] the problem is approaching the point of no return. Absent some action, the
destabilizing climate will bury cities, spawn life threatening natural disasters, and
jeopardize critical food and water supplies.”65 The Tenth Circuit summarized the
situation succinctly: “Less greenhouse gas emissions equals less climate change.”66
Although establishing a carbon emissions budget is politically and technically
complex, the fundamental principle is simple: reducing the risks of climate change
requires immediate efforts to reduce or offset GHG carbon emissions from every
source.67 The potentially dire future portrayed by climate models is preventable with
specific, deliberate action.68 Moreover, the foresight offered by climate models also
imposes a responsibility: “If we see it coming, we must act in a manner that is
commensurate to the scale and scope of the threat.”69
B.

The BLM has authority over nationally significant GHG emissions.

The BLM has responsibility for, and authority over, significant GHG emissions
in the U.S. In 2017, the U.S. was the world’s largest producer of crude oil and natural
gas.70 As of fiscal year 2018, the BLM administered more than 38,000 onshore oil and
gas leases extending across more than 25.5 million acres (almost 40,000 square64

Banda, Climate Science in the Courts supra note 17 at 2 (noting that the existence of climate
change and that human activity exacerbates climate change are no longer disputed by the federal
government or industry litigants).
65
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020).
66
WildEarth Guardians v. United States BLM, Case No. CV-18-73-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77409 (D. Mont. May 1, 2020).
67
NSMIP, A Security Threat Assessment supra note 11 at 13 (“Mitigating these risks requires
quickly reducing and phasing out global greenhouse gas emissions. As there are numerous policy
options for doing so, we refrain from recommending a single course of action. Instead, we call for
the world to achieve net-zero global emissions as soon as possible.”). See generally House Select
Committee on the Climate Crisis, Solving the Climate Crisis Majority Staff Report 116th Congress
479-496 (June 2020) (proposing a multi-faceted national strategy to achieve net-zero greenhouse
gas emissions by 2050 including a generalized goal to make public lands “part of the climate
solution”).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., United States Remains the World’s Top Producer of Petroleum and
Natural Gas Hydrocarbons (2018) https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36292 (EIA,
Crude Oil Production).
20201205 Draft
16

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3756375

** Pre-Publication Draft **
32 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. __ (2021)
miles).71 The BLM also administered coal leases covering over 458,000 acres.72
During FY 2019, these lands produced over 274 million barrels of oil—an additional
784 million barrels were produced from federally managed offshore areas and Native
American lands.73 Lands managed by the BLM also produced 3.3 billion cubic feet of
natural gas and 302 million tons of coal.74 With great production comes great
responsibility for the resulting emissions.
Fossil fuels extracted from public lands produce almost one quarter of all U.S.
CO2 emissions, according to an inventory conducted by the United States Geological
Survey (“USGS”).75 Coal mined on public lands accounted for more than 13 percent
of U.S. emissions over the past decade.76 Energy development on public lands also
accounted for 7.3 percent of total U.S. emissions of methane, another powerful GHG.77
Even after production stops, abandoned and orphaned wells and coal mines continue
to emit. According to the emission inventory produced by the EPA, abandoned oil and
gas wells have steadily produced between 6 and 7 million metric tons (MMT) of CO2
equivalent (CO2e) annually between 1990 and the present.78 Abandoned coal mines
have produced similar amounts each year.79
Despite climate forecasts, and having intimate knowledge of its emissions
portfolio, the BLM has been fostering development that will further increase emissions

71

Bureau of Land Mgnt., Dept. of the Interior, Oil and Gas Statistics
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/oil-and-gas-statistics (last visited
May 14, 2020).
72
Bureau of Land Mgnt., Dept. of the Interior, Coal Data https://www.blm.gov/programs/energyand-minerals/coal/coal-data.
73
Dept. of the Interior, Natural Resources Revenue Data (last visited May 14, 2020)
https://revenuedata.doi.gov/?tab=tab-production.
74
Id. An additional 1 billion and 393 million cubic-feet of natural gas were produced from federally
managed offshore and Native American lands, respectively. Id.
75
USGS FEDERAL LANDS GHG REPORT 2014 supra note 15 at 1, 8.
76
Adam Aton, Fossil Fuel Extraction on Public Lands Produces One Quarter of U.S. Emissions
Sci Am. Nov. 27, 2018 available at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fossil-fuelextraction-on-public-lands-produces-one-quarter-of-u-s-emissions/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2020)
77
USGS FEDERAL LANDS GHG REPORT 2014 supra note 15 at 1, 8.
78
US EPA GHG Inventory 2018 supra note 34 at Executive Summary, ES-8.
79
Id.
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from federal land.80 The Trump Administration encouraged and authorized additional
coal development, instead of completing the Programmatic EIS initiated to modernize
the coal program and incorporate climate change concerns.81 Similarly, the BLM
rolled back methane reduction efforts.82 Instead of implementing a 2016 rule that was
expected to reduce methane emissions on federal lands by 41-60 percent,83 the BLM
worked hard to devitalize the rule: first postponing, then suspending, then replacing the
rule.84
Between now and 2030, the United States is on track to account for 60 percent
of world growth in oil and gas production, expanding extraction by at least four times

80

For a real-time summary of the Trump Administration’s efforts to eliminate or reverse
environmental
policies,
see
Regulatory
Rollback
Tracker,
Harvard
Law,
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/regulatory-rollback-tracker/ (last visited June 3, 2020).
81
See E.O. 13783, Energy Independence supra note 11; and Exec. Order No. 13868, Promoting
Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth, 84 Fed. Reg. 15495 (Apr. 10, 2019); Secretarial Order
3348 “Concerning the Federal Coal Moratorium” (Mar. 29, 2017) (“I find that the public interest is
not served by halting the Federal coal program for an extended time, nor is a PEIS required to
consider potential improvements to the program.”).
82
See U.S. Dep’t of Interior., Waste Prevention, Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and
Resource Conservation Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 C.F.R. 3160 (2018),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-09-28/pdf/2018-20689.pdf (announcing recission
of Obama-era rule that clarified BLM’s authority to set royalty rates at or above 12.5 percent).
83
See Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties and Resource Conservation Rule, 81 Fed.
Reg. 83,008 (Nov. 18, 2016) postponed by Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties and
Resource Conservation; Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,430 (June 15,
2017).
84
See Blake A. Watson, Nullify, Postpone, Suspend, Stay, and Replace: The Trump Administration
and the Methane Waste Prevention Rule, 44 DAYTON L. REV. 363, 382 (2019) [hereinafter Watson,
Methane Waste Prevention Rule] (“Shortly after Donald Trump took office on January 20, 2017,
efforts were underway to abrogate the methane waste prevention rule, which became effective just
three days earlier. The first attempt, which involved the passage of nullification legislation, failed
when the necessary resolution was defeated in the United States Senate. The BLM thereafter
postponed the compliance dates set forth in the MWPR; however, this action was held to be unlawful
agency action. Undeterred, the BLM suspended the compliance dates; however, this action was
enjoined. Despite these legislative and regulatory setbacks, the Trump Administration and the oil
and gas industry obtained a judicial stay of the 2016 waste prevention rule for most of 2017 and
2018 and the BLM, in September 2018, promulgated a replacement rule. The ultimate fate of the
rescinded 2016 rule now depends on the outcome of pending lawsuits challenging the 2018 rule.”).
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more than any other country.85 According to the United Nations Environment Program
(“UNEP”) Emissions Gap Report, U.S. emissions are at least 15 percent above target
for pledged emission reductions.86 With every year that emissions continue to rise, the
goals in the Paris Agreement slip further out of reach. Although the U.S. has
withdrawn from the Paris Agreement, the scientific basis for the agreement remains
unchanged, even if the Agreement has unraveled for political reasons. Emission
reductions are necessary to keep global warming below 1.5°C. Because emission
reduction targets have not been met in the past, more aggressive reductions will be
necessary in the years ahead if we are to keep warming below 1.5°C.87
As a proportion of U.S. emissions, the 24 percent of national CO2 emissions
under BLM authority are a significant contribution.88 In comparison, the Supreme
Court found that “judged by any standard,” 6 percent of global GHG emissions was a
“meaningful contribution” to GHG concentrations and sufficient to support standing to
sue over injuries allegedly resulting from GHG emissions.89 In American Electric
Power, just 10 percent of domestic emissions was deemed sufficient to support
standing for the Second Circuit and at least four judges on the Supreme Court.90 In
Citizens for Clean Energy v. United States Department of Interior, the court recognized
that the federal coal program managed by the BLM was responsible for an estimated
11 percent of United States GHG emissions, and that the plaintiffs had a concrete
85

Kelly Trout & Lorne Stockman, Drilling Toward Disaster: Why U.S. Oil and Gas Expansion Is
Incompatible with Climate Limits, Oil Change International (Jan. 2019) available at
http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2019/01/Drilling-Towards-Disaster-Web-v3.pdf (last visited
April 27, 2020).
86
U.N. Env’t Programme, The Emissions Gap Report 2019 20 (2019) available at
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/30797/EGR2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllo
wed=y (noting that the U.S. target emission reductions were 26-28 percent from 2005 levels by 2025
and expressing concern that the Trump administration has reduced anticipated emission reductions
from power plants and frozen requirements for GHG reductions in vehicle emissions and fuel
economy standards, in addition to encouraging increased fossil fuel production on public land).
87
Chelsea Harvey, Nathaniel Gronewold, Global CO2 Footprint to Break Another Record in 2019,
E&E News (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061716715
88
See USGS FEDERAL LANDS GHG REPORT 2014 supra note 15 at 1, 8.
89
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007).
90
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d 564 U.S. 410 (2011); See
also Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz, Radley Horton, The Law and Science of Climate Change
Attribution, 45 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 57, 153-169 (2020) (reviewing cases including American
Electric).
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interest in decisions regarding the production, transportation, and or consumption of
coal due to its environmental effects.91 Finally, in Juliana v. United States, the district
court noted that U.S. agencies have authority over 14 percent of global GHGs, which
the court considered sufficient to satisfy the causation requirements of the court’s
standing analysis.92 These court decisions finding much smaller percentages of
emissions to be significant contributions to climate change put the BLM’s authority
over 24 percent of U.S. GHG emissions into perspective. This perspective clarifies
that even if individual permitting decisions appear de minimis, the BLM’s permitting
authority is nationally and globally significant.
Despite its clear contribution to climate change, the BLM is accelerating efforts
to lease federal lands and approve drilling permits for oil and natural gas, while
restricting public involvement and environmental review.93 Along the way, the BLM
has walked away from its commitment to modernize the federal coal program,94

91

Citizens v. Clean Energy v. United States Dept. of Int., 384 F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1274 (D. Mont.
2019).
92
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1246 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d on other grounds 947
F.3d 1159 (2020).
93
See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13783, Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy
Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (March 28, 2017) (directing agencies to
“review all existing regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and any other similar agency
actions . . . that potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy
resources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources” and
recommend actions that “could alleviate or eliminate aspects of agency actions that burden domestic
energy production.” See generally Michael C. Blumm and Olivier Jamin, The Trump Public Lands
Revolution: Redefining “The Public” in Public Land Law, 48 ENVTL. L. 311 (2018) (describing
multiple ways in which Trump-Era reforms reduced or eliminated avenues for public involvement
in federal land use planning decisions).
94
See BLM, Federal Coal Program, Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement-Scoping
Report, Volume I, Executive Summary, ES-4 (Jan. 2017) (“[M]odernization of the Federal coal
program is warranted. . . . This modernization should focus on ensuring a fair return to Americans
for the sale of their public coal resources; addressing the coal program’s impact on the challenge of
climate change; and improving the structure and efficiency of the coal program in light of current
market conditions.”) [hereinafter Federal Coal Program PEIS Scoping Report]. But see BLM,
Finding of No Significant Impact, “Lifting the Pause on the Issuance of New Federal Coal Leases
for Thermal (Steam) Coal, Environmental Assessment 1, 7 (Feb. 26, 2020) (“Because the BLM
made a reasoned decision not to complete the PEIS, the information the Jewell Order endeavored to
produce is unavailable and too complex in nature to produce in speculation. . . . Lifting the Pause
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rescinded all programs and policies addressing climate change,95 and adopted an
illogically restricted interpretation of its authority to mitigate the adverse effects of
proposed land uses.96 It is no wonder that some people feel that the BLM has lost its
way.97
III.

The BLM is Legally Obligated to Consider Climate Science and Manage
for Climate Change.

The BLM is charged with managing a vast resource portfolio consistent with
statutory management priorities set forth by Congress in the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (“FLPMA”) and other guiding statutes. Though the BLM has broad
discretion, that discretion must be guided by Congressional priorities and exercised
within statutory boundaries.98 Under FLPMA, BLM must protect air and atmospheric
resources and prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of public lands.”99 As applied
to managing oil and gas leasing, a federal court recently summarized BLM’s
management responsibilities: “BLM has a duty to prevent undue waste; and protect the
meant that the BLM resumed normal leasing activities consistent with practices established and
implemented for nearly 40 years.”
95
See, e.g., S.O. 3349 American Energy Independence (Mar. 29, 2017) Sec. 5(b) (instructing all
departments to compile and rescind climate related policies); Dept. of Interior, Final Report: Review
of the Department of Interior Actions that Potentially Burden Domestic Energy 16 (Oct. 24, 2017)
available
at
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/interior_energy_actions_report_final.pdf
[hereinafter DOI, Report of Actions that Potentially Burden Energy].
96
See BLM, Instruction Memorandum No. 2018-93, Compensatory Mitigation (July 24, 2018)
available at https://www.blm.gov/policy/im-2018-093 [https://perma.cc/AFT4-YSKK] [hereinafter
“IM 2018-93”]. For a further discussion, see infra Section V.B.; see also Justin Pidot, The Bureau
of Land Management’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation Policy, 30 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1
(2019) [hereinafter Pidot, The BLM’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation Policy].
97
Jim Kenna, Opinion, Bureau of Land Management Leaders Have Lost Their Way: A Former State
Director Argues Narrow Interests Have Dominated the Agency’s Direction Opinion, High Country
News (Paonia, Colo), May 26, 2020 https://www.hcn.org/articles/south-opinon-bureau-of-landmanagement-leaders-have-lost-their-way (last visited May 29, 2020).
98
California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128961 *41-48
(July 15, 2020) (holding that the BLM exceeded its statutory discretion by prioritizing the
economics of individual well operators over BLM’s statutory public welfare obligations articulated
in the FLPMA and the MLA).
99
California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128961 *40 (July
15, 2020) (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).
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interests of the United States and safeguard the public welfare.” 100 Ignoring climate
change and jeopardizing resources charged to its care is inconsistent with the BLM’s
duty to engage in reasoned decision-making according to its statutory charter,
particularly where the BLM has acknowledged the risks of climate change in the past.
A.

The BLM’s Organic Act establishes a standard of care; directs the
BLM to manage according to a multi-generational horizon; and
identifies resources, including the atmosphere, that should not be
permanently impaired.

FLPMA serves as the BLM’s organic statute.
In FLPMA, Congress
articulated a standard of care for the BLM’s management of federal assets; established
a multi-generational investment horizon; and identified specific environmental values,
including the atmosphere, for the BLM to protect from permanent impairment and
unnecessary or undue degradation.101
Although FLPMA grants the BLM broad management discretion, it sets a limit
to that discretion by articulating a standard of care that prevents unnecessary or undue
degradation, avoids permanent impairment, and ensures sustained yield of natural
resources. Congress imposed a mandatory duty when it stated that the BLM “shall, by
regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation of the lands.”102 Other phrases in FLPMA elaborate on the standard of
care. Federal lands shall be managed through land use plans “on the basis of multiple
use and sustained yield.”103 The terms “multiple use” and “sustained yield” are
100

Id. at *40 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128961 *41
(July 15, 2020) (“The words of the statute require that it be read broadly. More specifically, the
statute mandates that BLM act comprehensively to prevent the waste of public resources.”).
102
43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (emphasis added).
103
43 U.S.C. §1732 (a) (directing that the BLM “shall manage the public lands under principles of
multiple use and sustained yield, in accordance with land use plans developed under section 202 [43
U.S.C. §1712]); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1) (directing that the BLM “shall develop” land use
plans that “use and observe the principles of multiple use and sustained yield”); § 1701(a)(7)
(articulating the federal policy that “goals and objectives be established by law as guidelines for
public land use planning and that management be on the basis of multiple use and sustained yield
unless otherwise specified by law); § 1701(a)(8) (directing that “public lands be managed in a
manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air
and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate, will preserve
101
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separately defined. “Multiple use” requires the BLM to make “judicious use” of
federal lands without “permanent impairment” to the productivity and quality of the
environment.104 It also instructs the BLM to utilize resource values in a combination
“that will best meet the present and future needs of the American people . . . and not
necessarily to the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the
greatest unit output.”105 “Sustained yield” includes “the achievement and maintenance
in perpetuity” of renewable resources.106 These principles, distinctly articulated in
separate parts of FLPMA, define the standard of care Congress established for the
BLM’s management decisions.
Congress also established a multi-generational investment horizon as part of
the BLM’s management priorities. FLPMA requires the BLM to find a combination
of uses that “will best meet the present and future needs of the American people.”107
In defining the term “multiple use,” Congress reiterated the multi-generational time
frame for management duties, instructing BLM to find a combination of resource uses
“that takes into account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and
nonrenewable resources.”108 The references to “maintenance in perpetuity” of
renewable resources in the definition of “sustained yield” further indicate

and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will provide food and habitat for fish
and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide outdoor recreation and human occupancy
and use”);.
104
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (defining “multiple use”).
105
Id. Other phrases in the statute echo this theme. See 43 U.S.C. §1702(c)(“making the most
judicious use of the land for some or all of the resources . . .to provide sufficient latitude for periodic
adjustment in use to conform to changing needs and conditions”); § 1702(c) (“multiple use means
the management of the public lands and their various resource values so that they are utilized in the
combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the American people . . . that takes
into account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and nonrenewable resources .
. . with consideration being given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily the
combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output.);
§1712(c)(5) (land use plans shall consider present and potential uses of public lands); § 1712(c)(7)
(land use plans shall “weigh long term benefits to the public against short term benefits”).
106
43 U.S.C. § 1702(h).
107
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c).
108
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c).
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Congressional intention to impose a multi-generational investment horizon on the
BLM.109
Finally, Congress identified discrete ecological values that should be managed
without “permanent impairment” in the multiple use balance including watersheds,
rangeland, forests, fish and wildlife, air, and the atmosphere.110 The statute’s
introductory declaration of policy lists several resources including “the quality of . . .
ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological
values” as well as preservation of “certain public lands in their natural condition,” in
order to provide “food and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals, and
“outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use.”111 By using the introductory
declaration of policy to descriptively list ecological values that should be protected,
Congress expressed an intent as to what must not be permanently impaired or subject
to unnecessary or undue degradation in the balance of multiple use.112
Notably, the list of assets to be stewarded by the BLM includes “atmospheric
values.” The inclusion of atmosphere as a resource is specific and unambiguous. “The
preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to presume that the legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”113 History
indicates that Congress understood the risks and challenges of anthropogenic climate
change when it listed “air and atmospheric values” as one of the values that the BLM
must protect. Nine years before FLPMA was passed, climate change had already been
identified as an environmental risk. Reviewing the history of climate change
awareness, the Ninth Circuit summarized that “[a]s early as 1965, the Johnson
Administration cautioned that fossil fuel emissions threatened significant changes to

109

43 U.S.C. § 1702(h).
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8).
111
43 U.S.C. §1701(8).
112
3 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shamble Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § (7th ed. 2008)
47:8, at 313-14 (“The legislative purpose set forth in the purview of an enactment is assumed to be
the express legislative policy, and only those subjects expressly exempted by the proviso should be
freed from the operation of the statute.”); id. § 46:05 at 177 (“Where there is inescapable conflict
between general and specific terms or provisions of a statute, the specific will prevail.”).
113
Amalgamated Sugar Co .LLC v. Vilsack, 555 F.3d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting McDonald
v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2008)).
110
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climate, global temperatures, sea levels, and other stratospheric properties.”114 For
example, a White House Report published on November 5, 1965 detailed
environmental challenges facing the nation, including “atmospheric carbon
dioxide.”115 The report recognized that GHG emissions were altering the composition
of the atmosphere. “Within a few short centuries, we are returning to the air a
significant part of the carbon that was slowly extracted by plants and buried in the
sediments during half a billion years. . . . The part that remains in the atmosphere may
have a significant effect on the climate.”116 Thus, Congress was on notice that climate
change was a risky, negative byproduct of fossil fuel development when it instructed
the BLM to manage public lands “in a manner that will protect the quality of the . . .
air and atmospheric . . . values.,” and it intended the BLM to manage accordingly.117
More importantly, Congress understood that there would be multiple,
unforeseen challenges in striking the right balance of multiple uses. FLPMA’s broad
language grants the BLM regulatory flexibility to respond to new scientific evidence
and changing societal needs. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized when interpreting
the Clean Air Act, even if Congress “might not have appreciated the possibility that
burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they did understand that without
regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments would soon
render [the Act] obsolete.”118 This is no less true for FLPMA, where broad language
similarly “reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall
such obsolescence.”119 Climate models provide an unprecedented peek into the world
facing future generations, eliminating significant doubt as to the consequences of
continuing our current emissions trajectory.120 The BLM’s regulatory authority over
our nation’s hydrocarbon resources is governed by the standard of care set forth in
114

Juliana v. U.S., 947 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020) (“As early as 1965, the Johnson
Administration cautioned that fossil fuel emissions threatened significant changes to climate, global
temperatures, sea levels, and other stratospheric properties.”).
115
The White House, Report of the Environmental Pollution Panel President’s Science Advisory
Committee, Restoring the Quality of Our Environment (November 1965).
116
Roger Revelle et al., Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Appendix Y4 in The White House, Report of
the Environmental Pollution Panel President’s Science Advisory Committee, Restoring the Quality
of Our Environment (November 1965).
117
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8).
118
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
119
Id.
120
NSMIP, A Security Threat Assessment of Climate Change supra note 11 at 13.
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FLPMA. A deliberate strategy to mitigate the risks of increased GHG emissions caused
by hydrocarbon production would be consistent with FLPMA’s standard of care, multigenerational investment horizon, and instruction to protect ecological values, including
the atmosphere.121
B.

The BLM has already publicly acknowledged that increasing GHG
emissions will result in permanent impairment to ecological
systems, including those charged to its care.

In January 2016, the BLM undertook an investigation of the federal coal
leasing program, culminating in a Scoping Report that was issued in January 2017.122
The report concluded that modernization of the federal coal program was warranted
due, in part, to “the coal program’s impact on the challenge of climate change.”123 The
Scoping Report referred to scientific assessments that had been completed after the
EPA’s Endangerment Finding and stated: “The new assessments also confirm and
further strengthen the conclusion that greenhouse gases endanger public welfare, and
emphasize the urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions due to their projections
that show greenhouse gas concentrations climbing to ever-increasing levels in the
absence of mitigation.”124
In particular, the BLM emphasized a study, published by the National Research
Council, concluding that without emission reductions, the atmospheric composition
“may be approaching a critical climate threshold beyond which rapid and potentially
permanent—at least on a human timescale—changes not anticipated by climate models
. . . may occur.”125 The BLM also emphasized a second study published by the National
Research Council regarding the risks of abrupt impacts to society and ecosystems if
physical thresholds within the earth’s system, including the atmospheric composition,
are crossed.126 One of the abrupt impacts emphasized by the BLM was the threat of
“rapid state changes in ecosystems and species extinctions,” which the BLM
121

Id.
Id.
123
Id. at ES-4.
124
Id. at 5-50.
125
Id. (quoting National Research Council, Understanding Earth’s Deep Past: Lessons for Our
Climate Future 2 (2011) available at https://www.nap.edu/catalog/13111/understanding-earth’sdeep-past-lessons-for-our-climate-future.
126
Id. at 5-50 to 5-51 (discussing National Research Council, Abrupt Impacts of Climate Change:
Anticipating Surprises (2013) available at http://nap.edu/18373).
122
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characterized as examples of irreversible impacts “that are expected to be exacerbated
by climate change.”127 Relying upon these and other studies, the BLM concluded,
“reducing emissions of greenhouse gases across the globe is necessary in order to avoid
the worst impacts of climate change and underscore the urgency of reducing emissions
now.”128 As discussed in Section II.A., in the three years since that report was released,
scientific consensus has only become stronger and the situation more urgent.
The BLM did not use the words “permanent impairment” when discussing the
risk of crossing thresholds and exacerbating species extinction in the Scoping Report,
but the connection is evident. Rapid ecological state changes and widespread species
extinctions are irreversible events that will cause “permanent impairment” to
ecological values entrusted to the BLM’s care. For example, “range, timber . . .
watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural, scenic, scientific, and historical values”129
will all be affected by “rapid state changes in ecosystems and species extinctions.”130
Because crossing a critical climate threshold puts resources under the BLM’s care at
risk of permanent impairment, permitting decisions that increase the risk of crossing a
critical climate threshold are inconsistent with the statutory definition of multiple use.
It does not matter that the BLM discussed the risks of “crossing a critical climate
threshold” in the context of coal mining, rather than oil and gas development. The
same facts apply to any fossil fuel. Continuing to permit expanded development of
fossil fuels exacerbates the risk of crossing a critical climate threshold and causing
permanent impairment to the quality of the environment and the productivity of the
land managed by the BLM, contrary to the statutory standard of care set forth in
FLPMA.
Although the BLM has broad discretion when making decisions under the
Mineral Leasing Act, it’s discretion “remains constrained” by the statutory priorities
set forth in FLPMA.131 Having already acknowledged the scientific urgency of
reducing GHG emissions, BLM permitting decisions should comport with that
127

BLM, Federal Coal Program PEIS Scoping Report supra note 82 at 5-51.
Id. at 5-52.
129
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c).
130
Compare BLM, Federal Coal Program PEIS Scoping Report supra note 82 at 5-51.
131
Citizens for a Clean Environment v. United States D.O.I., 384 F. Supp. 1264, 1271 (Apr. 19,
2019) (Although the BLM enjoys broad discretion to make mineral leasing decisions on federal
lands, it “remains constrained, however, by the Federal Lands Policy Act and the Mineral Leasing
Act.”).
128
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conclusion and demonstrate a rational connection between the facts found and the
decision made. Like every agency, the BLM is bound by the fundamental requirement
of administrative law that agencies engage in “reasoned decisionmaking” and act
within the bounds of their statutory duties.132 Final agency actions that do not meet the
standards of reasoned decisionmaking may be challenged under the Administrative
Procedure Act as arbitrary and capricious.133 As the Supreme Court recently pointed
out, “the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people.”134 One
of those square corners is the requirement to “examine the relevant data and articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.”135 The BLM’s management and permitting
decisions must satisfy this standard. Where the “relevant data” uniformly indicates
that increasing GHG emissions will exacerbate climate change and cause permanent
impairment to resources entrusted to the BLM, there is no satisfactory explanation for
ignoring that data in the BLM’s management or permitting decisions.
Courts have shown an increasing willingness to require agencies to grapple
with the realities of climate change in fulfilling their statutory duties. For example,
although the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration (“NHTSA”)
has enjoyed broad discretion in establishing fuel efficiency standards,136 it met the
boundaries of that discretion in 2007 when it failed to incorporate climate change into
its analysis in setting fuel efficiency standards. In Center for Biological Diversity v.
NHTSA, the Ninth Circuit found that the fuel economy rule issued by NHTSA was
arbitrary and capricious because it failed to prioritize energy conservation, which was
Congress’ purpose in enacting the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”).137
In defending the rule, which prioritized other factors, like market dynamics and cost of
132

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Case No. 18-587, 519 U.S. ____ (June
18, 2020); 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3254, *20 (noting that the procedural requirements of administrative
law establish the mechanism “by which federal agencies are accountable to the public and their
actions subject to review”).
133
5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A).
134
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3254at *32.
135
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
136
Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that NHTSA
appropriately balanced consumer demand with the statutory policy of fuel conservation in light of
the broad guidelines established by Congress in EPCA); Pub. Citizen v. NHTSA, 848 F.2d 256 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (consideration of economic hardship was within agency discretion).
137
Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1181-82, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008).
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implementation, over energy conservation, NHTSA relied upon previous court
decisions that deferred to NHTSA’s discretion to balance priorities in setting fuel
efficiency standards.138 The court distinguished those cases. “[T]he persuasiveness of
the analysis in [previous cases] is limited by the fact that they were decided two decades
ago, when scientific knowledge of climate change and its causes were not as advanced
as they are today.”139 Citing climate change concerns, the court pointed out, “The need
of the nation to conserve energy is even more pressing today than it was at the time of
EPCA’s enactment. . . . What was a reasonable balancing of competing statutory
priorities twenty years ago may not be a reasonable balancing of those priorities
today.”140 Because NHTSA failed to prioritize energy conservation, which was “the
fundamental purpose of the statute” and “an explicit statutory factor that NHTSA
‘shall’ consider,” failure to prioritize conservation was arbitrary and capricious.141 The
court emphasized, “‘An agency may not ignore factors Congress explicitly required to
be taken into account.’”142
The same legal standard and logic applied by the Ninth Circuit in Center for
Biological Diversity v. NHTSA applies to BLM permitting decisions. What may have
been a reasonable balancing of multiple use priorities twenty years ago, may not be a
reasonable balancing of those priorities today. Climate models uniformly indicate that
the long-term, cumulative impacts of increasing fossil fuel development will
permanently impair resources that Congress instructed the BLM to judiciously manage.
The BLM has acknowledged that those models and other studies “underscore the
urgency of reducing emissions now.”143 The incremental nature of individual
permitting decisions does not shield the BLM from its statutory duty to manage on a
multi-generational horizon, avoid permanent impairment, and prevent unnecessary or
undue degradation to the resources under its care. A fundamental purpose of FLPMA
is to identify a standard of care and impose a multi-generational investment horizon on
the BLM’s management decisions. Permitting decisions that exacerbate climate
change by allowing an unmitigated increase in GHG emissions arbitrarily and
138

Id. at 1195-97.
Id. at 1198.
140
Id. at 1197-98.
141
Id. at 1205-06.
142
Id. at 1205-06 (quoting Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 494 F. 3d 757, 765 (9th Cir. 2007)).
143
BLM, Federal Coal Program PEIS Scoping Report supra note 82 at 5-52; see also ES-4
(concluding that the federal coal program must be modernized in part to address the coal program’s
impact on the challenge of climate change).
139
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capriciously ignore statutory factors, like the duty to avoid permanent impairment of
resource values, including the atmosphere. Accordingly, without incorporating climate
science into its land management decisions, the BLM cannot fulfill its statutory duties
under the Federal Land Management Policy Act or its legal responsibility to avoid
arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.
C.

Addressing climate change is not a policy preference.

Recent court decisions reveal a judicial trend recognizing that climate science
is not a policy preference. A comprehensive and insightful review of climate related
cases between 2015 and 2020 published by the non-partisan Environmental Law
Institute reveals that “vast judicial agreement exists on the causes, extent, urgency, and
consequences of climate change.”144 This observation “holds true across U.S. federal
and state courts, across different types of proceedings, and across jurisdictions,”
including international jurisdictions.145 The report takes care to point out that all
parties, including government agencies like the BLM, appeared to agree on basic
climate science even if they disagreed on the legal implications.146
Several courts have reminded agencies that facts about the risks of global
warming survive changes of administration. “[E]ven when reversing policy after an
election, an agency may not simply discard prior factual findings without a reasoned
explanation.”147 For example, in Indigenous Environmental Network v. United States
Department of State, the federal court reviewed the Trump Administration’s reversal
of a decision to deny approval for the Keystone XL Pipeline.148 The history is as
follows. In 2015, the Obama Administration declined to issue a cross border permit
for the pipeline.149 The denial was based on the risk of exacerbating climate change,
144

Banda, Climate Science in the Courts supra note 17 at vi.
Id. at 73-74.
146
Id.
147
Indigenous Environmental Network v. U.S. Dept. of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mont. 2018),
rev’d as moot, No. 18-36068 (9th Cir. June 6, 2019).
148
Id. The Record of Decision resulted in a National Interest Determination and a Presidential
Permit to allow TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP to construct a cross-border oil pipeline known
as Keystone XL, which would carry tar sands oil from the interior of Alberta to Steele City,
Nebraska.
149
U.S. Dep’t. of State, Record of Decision and National Interest Determination: Trans Canada
Keystone Pipeline, L.P. Application for Presidential Permit (Nov. 3, 2015) [hereinafter 2015
Keystone ROD]
145
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as set forth in the 2015 Record of Decision (“2015 ROD”).150 As justification for the
denial, the 2015 ROD referred to the necessity of reducing global carbon emissions in
order to keep warming below 2°C. “This is a critical time for action on climate change.
The science is clear and widely accepted, including among foreign governments, that
climate change is occurring now, that human activity is the dominant cause, and that
climate change impacts are already being felt around the world.”151 The 2015 ROD
acknowledged that approval of the pipeline would be understood as a decision to
facilitate GHG-intensive crude imports, undermining the transformation to low-carbon
economies. “Therefore, a decision to approve this proposed project would undermine
U.S. objectives . . . which identified climate change and the reduction of global
emissions as a national security priority.”152 In reversing course, the Trump
Administration simply removed the paragraphs referring to climate change, and
characterized the change as a “mere policy shift.”153 The court rejected the argument
that a policy shift could not be found arbitrary and capricious.154 “An agency cannot
simply disregard contrary or inconvenient factual determinations that it made in the
past, any more than it can ignore inconvenient facts when it writes on a blank slate.”155
A conclusory analysis that climate change impacts were inconsequential did not rise to
a reasoned explanation, and without a reasoned justification for disregarding the
urgency of climate change, the agency decision was arbitrary and capricious.
Other courts have reached similar conclusions when agencies have ignored
earlier factual findings related to climate change. Recently, in the context of climate
change, a federal court for the Northern District of California held that the arbitrary
and capricious standard “prohibits [an agency] from disregarding available scientific
evidence that is some way better than the evidence [it] relies on.”156 That case,
California v. Bernhardt, considered the BLM’s justification for replacing a regulatory
scheme designed to minimize methane waste in oil and gas production (the 2016 Waste
150

Id.
Id. at 31.
152
Id. at 28.
153
U.S. Dep’t. of State, Record of Decision and National Interest Determination: Trans Canada
Keystone Pipeline, L.P. Application for Presidential Permit (Mar. 23, 2017) [hereinafter 2017
Keystone ROD]
154
Indigenous Environmental Network, 347 F. Supp. 3d at 583.
155
Id. at 584.
156
California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128961 *75
(N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020) (alterations in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
151
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Prevention Rule) with a less stringent set of regulations (2018 Recission). The BLM’s
justification for the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule relied heavily on the benefits of
reducing GHG emissions.157 The BLM’s analysis included a benefit-cost assessment
that considered the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC).158 As the court summarized, “This
approach was developed over several years through robust scientific and peer-reviewed
analyses and public processes, and represents the best available science on this
issue.”159 When the BLM replaced the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule with a rule
designed to be less burdensome on industry (2018 Recission), it did not use the SCC
metric.160 Instead, it developed an “interim” metric that excluded the global
consequences of climate change.161 The BLM’s interim metric underestimated the
domestic effects of climate change and excluded the global effects of climate change
(like disregarding the effects on 8 million citizens living abroad) when considering the
consequences of its new rule relaxing methane emission standards for oil and gas
development on federal land.162 In finding this approach arbitrary and capricious, the
court summarized, “An agency simply cannot construct a model that confirms a
preordained outcome while ignoring a model that reflects the best science available.”163
Consequently, the court found that the BLM’s decision to ignore climate science

157

Id. at *14 (recounting the BLM’s original estimates that the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule “would
generate up to $14 million in additional royalties, as well as annually avoid an estimated 175,000180,000 tons of methane emissions and reduce emissions of both volatile organic compounds by
250,000 to 267,000 tons).
158
Id. at *16 (explaining that the SCC metric was developed by the Interagency Working Group to
provide “a single, harmonized value for greenhouse gas emissions for federal agencies to use in their
regulatory impact analyses”); id. at *71 (summarizing that the metric estimates the present value of
damages caused by each additional ton of greenhouse gas emitted at a point in time—or the benefit
of avoided GHG emissions).
159
Id. at *71.
160
83 Fed. Reg. 49,184.
161
California v. Bernhardt, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128961 at 71.
162
Id. at 80.
163
Id. at *85. The court’s analysis further emphasized that political machinations cannot erase facts.
Recognizing that Executive Order 13783 issued by the Trump Administration had withdrawn the
relevant technical support documents for the SCC metric, the court pointed out that the Executive
Order “did not and could not erase the scientific and economic facts that formed the foundation for
that estimate . . . . In other words, the President did not alter by fiat what constitutes the best
available science.” Id. at 77.
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“‘fail[s] to consider . . . important aspect[s] of the problem’ and ‘runs counter to the
evidence before the agency.’”164
Similarly, in Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, a federal district court reviewed a
Fish and Wildlife Service decision reversing course on a decision to list the wolverine
as endangered due to habitat degradation caused by climate change.165 The court
carefully reviewed the administrative record and concluded that the justifications
offered by the agency failed to provide a reasoned justification for the course
reversal.166 “[T]he Service’s stance here borders on the absurd—if evidence shows that
wolverines need snow for denning purposes, and the best available science projects a
loss of snow as a result of climate change where and when the wolverines den, then
what sense does it make to deny that climate change is a threat to the wolverine simply
because research has yet to prove exactly why wolverines need deep snow for
denning.”167 Because the decision ran counter to the evidence before the service, it too
was reversed as arbitrary and capricious.168
The court took a similar stance in California v. EPA, when reviewing a
challenge to the EPA’s announcement that it would reconsider greenhouse gas
emission standards adopted in 2012 for model years 2022 to 2025 motor vehicles.169
The extensive rulemaking record supporting the 2012 standards estimated that it would
save four billion barrels of oil, reduce GHG emissions by two billion metric tons, and

164

Id. at 80 (alterations in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983)).
165
Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, 176 F. Supp. 3d 975 (D. Mont. 2016). The court also rejected
FWS efforts to characterize the consequences of climate change as uncertain due to modeling
challenges and a lack of information about the wolverine. “[S]uch conclusory treatment based on a
dearth of information is impermissible under the APA. . . . The service must rationally explain why
the uncertainty regarding a particular issue counsels in favor of one conclusion rather than the
opposite conclusion.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
166
See, e.g., 176 F. Supp. 3d at 999 (“Why did the Service make the decision it did in the Proposed
Rule, based on what it determined to be the best available science, and reject that decision eighteen
months later? Based on the record, the Court suspects that a possible answer to this question can be
found in the immense political pressure brought to bear on the issue. . . . The listing decision in this
case involves climate science, and climate science evokes strong reactions.”).
167
176 F. Supp. at 1005.
168
Id. at 1003.
169
940 F.3d 1342, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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generate net lifetime fuel savings of $3,400 to $5,000 per vehicle sold.170 But after the
change in presidential administrations, “the EPA changed lanes” and announced that it
would reconsider the 2012 standard.171 Although the court concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction because no “final action” had occurred yet, it took an opportunity to
counsel the EPA: “If EPA’s rulemaking results in changes to the existing 2012
standards, it will be required to provide a reasoned explanation and cannot ignore prior
factual findings and the supporting record evidence contradicting the new policy.”172
In Citizens for Clean Energy v. United States Department of Interior, the court
rejected the BLM’s characterization of coal leasing decisions as “mere policy shifts.”173
In that case, the Trump administration had issued an order reversing a 2016 moratorium
on new coal leasing and directed the BLM to expeditiously process coal lease
applications and modifications based on regulations and guidance in place prior to the
moratorium.174 One justification supporting the 2016 moratorium was to “avoid the
risk of ‘locking in for decades the future development of large quantities of coal” under
the prior regulatory standards.175 The BLM characterized the reversal as “a mere policy
shift and return to the status quo.”176 The court recognized the order as a major federal
action with potentially significant environmental impacts, thus triggering NEPA.177
Because expediting coal mining could have a significant effect on the environment, it
was arbitrary and capricious to lift the moratorium without first evaluating the
environmental impacts in accordance with NEPA.178 Although the court declined to
170

Id. at 1346.
Id.at 1348.
172
Id. at 1353.
173
Citizens for Clean Energy v. United States Dept. of Int., 384 F. Supp. 1264, 1281 (D. Mont. Apr.
19, 2019).
174
Id. at 1277. In February 2017, BLM possessed forty-four pending lease and lease modification
applications. Id. at 1271. Coal from federal land already constituted over 40 percent of U.S. coal
production. Id. In 2014, the federal coal program was responsible for an estimated 11 percent of
total U.S. GHG emissions. Id. at 1274. Processing new leases would expand production and
increase GHG-related emissions. Id. at 1280.
175
Id. at 1280.
176
Id. at 1279.
177
Id. at 1279 (“The existence of a NEPA triggering event depends on whether there is a new
proposed major federal action. The threshold to trigger NEPA remains relatively low. A NEPA
triggering event merely requires that a plaintiff raise substantial questions whether a project may
have a significant effect on the environment.”).
178
Id. at 1279, 1281.
171
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order the BLM to prepare an EIS as opposed to an EA, the court reminded the BLM
that determining significance requires a rational connection between the facts found
and the decision made.179 In light of all the available science, it is unlikely that any
agency, no matter how creative, could gather a “convincing statement of reasons” to
explain why continuing to issue coal leases without mitigating the risks of climate
change would have an insignificant effect on the environment.
These cases demonstrate a judicial trend recognizing that climate change is a
scientific fact, not a policy preference. 180 Although agencies have broad discretion in
how to respond to climate change, decisions that ignore climate change are increasingly
recognized as arbitrary and capricious. Looking ahead, this judicial trend has
implications for the BLM. Having already acknowledged the scientific consensus that
increasing GHG emissions will exacerbate climate change and increase the risk of
crossing critical climate thresholds, the BLM “cannot simply disregard contrary or
inconvenient factual determinations that it made in the past.”181 A conclusory analysis
that the climate change impacts of a single permitting decision are inconsequential does
not rise to a reasoned explanation where the BLM has permitting authority over 24
percent of the nation’s GHG emissions.182 Focusing solely on the individual impacts
of a permitting decision, without considering the BLM’s national authority over GHG
emissions fails to consider an important aspect of the problem and runs counter to the
evidence before the agency.183 With roughly 250 million acres of land surface under
179

384 F. Supp. 3d at 1282 (“If Federal Defendants determine that an EIS would not be necessary,
however, the Federal Defendants must supply a ‘convincing statement of reasons’ to explain why
the Zinke Order’s impacts would be insignificant.” (quoting Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998)).
180
Indigenous Environmental Network v. U.S. Dept. of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 584 (D. Mont.
2018), rev’d as moot, No. 18-36068 (9th Cir. June 6, 2019) (“An agency cannot simply disregard
contrary or inconvenient factual determinations that it made in the past, any more than it can ignore
inconvenient facts when it writes on a blank slate.”); California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128961 *75 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020) (alterations in original)
(internal quotations and citations omitted) (rejecting argument that an executive order relieved the
BLM’s duty to consider the social costs of climate change because “the President did not alter by
fiat what constitutes the best available science”);
181
Indigenous Environmental Network, 347 F. Supp. at 584.
182
See infra section II.B.
183
Compare California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128961 *80 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
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its care, a statutory duty to protect environmental attributes that will be affected by
climate change (like water resources, fish and wildlife habitat, and atmospheric values),
permitting authority over 24 percent of the nation’s GHG emissions, and the ability to
increase or decrease future emissions, the BLM simply cannot continue to ignore
climate change in its permitting decisions without violating the management priorities
set forth in FLPMA and the reasoned decision-making standard set forth in the APA.
D.

Past is not prologue. Agencies must plan and act based on
foreseeable future conditions.

“[T]he assumption that current and future climatic conditions will resemble
the recent past is no longer valid.”184 This statement, made in the Fourth National
Assessment on Climate Change, identifies a challenge for agencies who must make
management decisions that project into the future. Because climate change is creating
a “new normal” with altered climatic patterns, projections that are based on
continuation of existing conditions may not meet this burden.185
The BLM must engage in reasoned decision-making. As the Supreme Court
articulated almost forty years ago, an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious “if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that
it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”186
As a practical matter, the “best available science” is critical to understanding
“important aspect[s] of the problem” and part of the “evidence before the agency.”
184

NCA4 Vol. 2, Climate Science Report in Brief supra note 17 at 26.
This has prompted several commentators to make observations about the death of stationarity.
See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”- Long Live Transformation: Five Principles
for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 14-15 (2010); Mark Squillace,
Rethinking Public Land Use Planning, 43 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 415, 424 (2019) [hereinafter
Squillace, Rethinking Public Land Use Planning] (“‘Stationarity’ is the idea that differences in an
observed natural phenomenon occur within a fixed or constant range over time”); P. C. D. Milly et
al., Stationarity is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573, 573-74 (2008)”); see also
IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at 5, ¶ A.3.1 (“Impacts on
natural and human systems from global warning have already been observed (high confidence).
Many land and ocean ecosystems and some of the services they provide have already changed due
to global warming (high confidence).”).
186
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
185
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Agencies decisions that “run counter to the evidence before the agency” or “entirely
fail to consider an important aspect of the problem” do not meet the reasoned decisionmaking standard required by the Administrative Procedure Act and elaborated upon by
the Supreme Court.
In the context of climate change, scientific consensus uniformly indicates that
future conditions will diverge from the past. Consistent with the requirement that
agencies engage in reasoned decision-making, courts are becoming increasingly
rigorous with the requirement that agencies consider forecasts and climate models to
meaningfully discuss reasonably foreseeable conditions in light of climate change. For
example, in AquAlliance v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of
Reclamation relied upon historical data from 1922 to 2003 to anticipate water supply
for a 10-year water transfer program in California’s Central Valley.187 The court
rejected this approach, holding that “[t]he past century is no longer a reasonable guide
to the future for water management.”188 Climate change models indicated a 16 percent
reduction in snow pack by 2035, which would alter the timing and amount of water
supplies and pose a significant challenge for water resource management.189 The
agency’s backward-facing conclusion that the climate change impacts to the project
would be insignificant was arbitrary and capricious because it arose out of a “failure to
consider an important aspect of the problem,” the strong scientific evidence of a much
starker future.190
Similarly, two additional cases found agency reliance on historic
environmental conditions contrary to the best available science and therefore arbitrary
and capricious. In National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service,
the court found the Service’s assumption that current climatic conditions would
continue into the future contrary to the best available science and therefore arbitrary
and capricious.191 NMFS had been called upon to issue a Biological Opinion on
impacts to protected salmon species and that were likely to result from the continued
operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System. Noting the laundry list of
challenges brought by climate change to the Pacific salmon population, the court found

187

287 F. Supp. 3d 969, 1028 (E.D. Calif. Feb. 15, 2018).
Id. at 1029.
189
Id. at 1028-29.
190
Id. at 1032 (internal quotations omitted).
191
184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 874 (D. Or. 2016).
188

20201205 Draft
37

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3756375

** Pre-Publication Draft **
32 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. __ (2021)
that NMFS’s analysis “fails to properly analyze the effects of climate change.”192
Among other problems, the court noted that the agency “assumed recent climate
conditions would remain the same” and “did not engage in any analysis” to assess
whether the future effects of climate change would diminish the effectiveness of
proposed mitigation measures.193 Also, even though substantial scientific literature
concluded that climate conditions in the ocean would worsen during the time frame of
the analysis, the agency assumed that the recent historic condition of the ocean would
“repeat itself.”194
In Wild Fish Conservancy v. Irving, the federal court reached a near identical
conclusion.195 In that case, the agency (NMFS) analyzed whether operating a fish
hatchery would threaten the existence of endangered fish spawning in the same
watershed. “NMFS discusses the effects of climate change generally, and then
proceeds with analysis on the apparent assumption that there will be no change to the
hydrology of Icicle Creek.”196 The court went on to conclude that although the agency
need not conduct a study or build a model, “its analysis must consider that the best
available science . . . suggests that baseline historical flow averages may not be
effective predictors of future flows.”197 In other words, using the past as prologue is
arbitrary and capricious where climate models forecast change.
Uncertainty inherent in predicting the future is not an excuse for agencies to
avoid looking at climate projections. For example, the Arctic grayling is a freshwater
fish that depends on cold water and adequate stream flow for survival.198 In evaluating
whether to list the Arctic Grayling under the Endangered Species Act, the Fish and
Wildlife Service acknowledged a recent trend showing lower stream flows and warmer
water temperatures, but relied instead upon limited data suggesting the possibility that
the Arctic grayling could adapt by migrating to cold water refugia in one portion of the

192

Id.
184 F. Supp. 3d at 917 (“NOAA Fisheries had information that climate change might well
diminish or eliminate the effectiveness of some of the BiOp’s habitat mitigation efforts, but does
not appear to have analyzed these effects.”
194
Id. at 918.
195
221 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1227-28 (E.D. Wa. 2016).
196
Id. at 1233.
197
Id. at 1234.
198
Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053, 1072 (9th Cir. 2018).
193
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habitat.199 In other words, the FWS declined to consider the cumulative effects of
climate change on observed conditions. Although the available models indicated that
“water temperatures will likely increase with climate change in the future” and
“dewatering threats will be exacerbated” by climate change,200 the FWS claimed that
“uncertainty about how different temperature and precipitation scenarios could affect
water availability make projecting possible synergistic effects of climate change on the
Arctic grayling too speculative at this time.”201 In Center for Biological Diversity v.
Zinke, the court found this approach “unacceptable.”202 “It is not enough for FWS to
simply invoke ‘scientific uncertainty’” and rely on uncertainty as a foil against
scientific analysis.203 Agencies must consider the evolving nature of climate science
and failing to grapple with climate change projections that would exacerbate current
conditions was arbitrary and capricious.204
In contrast, agency decisions that incorporate climate change projections have
been upheld, even where there is uncertainty about how climate change may affect
specific locations.205 For example, in Alaska Oil & Gas Association v. Jewell, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the FWS designation of critical habitat for the polar bear against industry
challenges that the designation was overly protective.206 In addition to considering
multiple models, the FWS also noted that “the observational record of current sea ice
losses indicates that losses seem to be about 30 years ahead of the modeled values,
which suggests a seasonally ice-free Arctic may come a lot sooner than expected.”207

199

Id. at 1070.
Id at 1073.
201
Id. at 1072.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 1072 (quoting Greater Yellowstone Coalition Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1028 (9th
Cir. 2011)).
204
Id. at 1073.
205
See e.g., Alaska Oil & Gas v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2016) (FWS designation of
critical habitat for the polar bear upheld despite some lack of specificity regarding proof that the
entire designated landscape contained required features of denning and barrier island habitats used
by polar bears. “While the agency may not base its listings on speculation or surmise, where there
is no superior data, occasional imperfections do not violate [the ESA.” (internal quotations omitted).
206
815 F.3d 544, 559 (9th Cir. 2018).
207
Id.
200
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The FWS properly took this information into account when considering how climate
change would likely affect ongoing changes to the polar bear habitat.208
Similarly, in Colorado v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the court
upheld the agency’s reliance on forecasts regarding climate change and drought in
considering whether to list the Gunnison sage-grouse as threatened.209 The FWS
observed that Colorado was warming more rapidly than other areas of the country,
cited multiple studies on how hot and dry conditions affect the sage grouse, and listed
other consequences of climate change including prolonged drought, fire, cheatgrass
invasion, and insect reduction.210 The court found that the FWS assessment of an
increased threat from climate change was not arbitrary and capricious.211
In summary, where climate change forecasts predict degraded ecological
functions, agencies cannot avoid considering future degradation by relying on historic
data. Even though specific detail about the local effects of a projected trend may not
be available, agency decisions that ignore forecasted trends and rely upon local historic
data have been found arbitrary and capricious. For the BLM, this trend also has clear
management implications. The BLM cannot rely solely upon the past: it must consider
a future complicated by climate change. Where available climate models forecast
climatic changes, the BLM must consider the implications of those changes, even if
the exact parameter of the change is uncertain. Impacts that were historically
insignificant may become significant when assessed in light of the environmental
trends indicated by climate forecasts. With climate modeling pointing toward a hotter
dryer future, the need for BLM to incorporate the effects of climate change into its
management decisions grows more pressing by the day. Consistent with the duty to
avoid permanent impairment and prevent unnecessary or undue degradation, land use

208

See also Safari Club Int’l v. Salazar (In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and
Section 4(d) Rule Litig.), 709 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cr. 2012) (upholding FWS listing of polar bear as
endangered based on climate change models projecting loss of sea ice throughout the arctic and
observations that actual sea ice loss outstripped pace of model forecasts “FWS understood and
explained the models’ limitations and carefully explained why its limited reliance on the models
was justified.”)
209
362 F. Supp. 3d 951, 969 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2018).
210
Id. at 971.
211
Id.; see also Desert Survivors v. U.S. Dept. of Int., No. 16-cv-01165-JCS, Slip Op. (N.D. Cal.
May 15, 2018)
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decisions, including permitting decisions and mitigation strategies must adjust to
reflect the foreseeable future conditions.
IV.

NEPA’s statutory mandate and the Department of the Interior’s
implementing regulations require the BLM to take a “hard look” at the
environmental consequences of a decision, including cumulative effects of
climate change.

NEPA was enacted by Congress in recognition of “the profound impact of
man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment,
particularly the profound influences of . . . resource exploitation.”212 NEPA uses public
disclosure to “fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations.”213 The Supreme Court summarized the
statute’s methodology as follows: “The sweeping policy goals announced in § 101 of
NEPA are thus realized through a set of ‘action-forcing’ procedures that require that
agencies take a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences, and that provide for broad
dissemination of relevant environmental information.”214 The twin aims of public
disclosure and careful consideration of environmental impacts are “intended to help
public officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental
consequences and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment.”215
To ensure that the environmental consequences of an action are properly
considered and disclosed, agencies must “utilize a systemic, interdisciplinary approach
which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the
environmental design arts in planning and in decision-making, which may have an
impact on man’s environment.”216 For every “major federal action” that may
significantly affect “the quality of the human environment,” agencies must prepare a

212

42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1).
214
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
215
See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (“NEPA
has twin aims. First it places upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of
the environmental impact of a proposed action. Second, it ensures that the agency will inform the
public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.”).
216
42 U.S.C. § 4332(A).
213
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“detailed statement.”217 The document’s level of detail depends on the likely
significance of the environmental consequences.218
All “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment” require the agency to prepare an environmental impact statement
(“EIS”).219 An EIS “shall” include a description of (1) the environmental impact of the
proposed action; (2) any adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided; (3)
alternatives to the proposed action; (4) the relationship between local short-term uses
of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity; and (5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources.220
When the BLM prepares an EIS it must also include a discussion of alternatives
including, “appropriate mitigation measures not already included in the proposed
action or alternatives.”221 The Record of Decision accompanying an EIS must “state
whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm from the
alternative selective have been adopted, and if not, why they were not.”222
For the past 42 years, determining whether environmental impacts are
“significant” has required an analysis of direct223 and indirect224 effects of the proposed

217

42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
The following discussion refers to CEQ NEPA regulations (40 C.F.R. §§1501.1 et seq), which
were amended on July 26, 2020. 85 Fed. Reg. 43304 (July 16, 2020). Where the discussion relies
upon the earlier version of regulations, the citation is provided with (2019). Reference to the new
regulations is indicated by specifying where the regulation will be codified in 2020. As much as
possible, where the regulatory change has no meaningful effect on the discussion, reference to the
new version of regulations is provided. This section also references Department of Interior NEPA
regulations (43 C.F.R. §§ 46.10 et seq.), which have not been amended, but the 2019 version of the
CFR for those regulations is the most current version to date.
219
42 U.S.C. § 4332; 43 C.F.R. §§ 46.400 to 46.450 (2019).
220
Id. § 4332(C).
221
42 U.S. C. § 4332(E); 43 C.F.R. §§ 46.415(a)(6)(2019), (b); 46.420(b)- (d)(2019); 46.425(2019);
46.130(2019). See also 85 Fed. Reg. 43304 (July 16, 2020) to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(e)
(requiring consideration of mitigation measures).
222
85 Fed. Reg. at 43369, to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(2020).
223
40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2019). (Direct effects “are caused by the action and occur at the same
time and place.)
224
40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2019) (Indirect effects are “caused by the action and later in time or
farther removed in the distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable. Indirect effects may include
growth inducing effects and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land use,
218
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action as well as the cumulative impacts225 of the proposed action when considered in
light of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.226 These terms were
defined by regulations published by the White House Council on Environmental
Quality (“CEQ”), interpreted extensively by courts, and supplemented by individual
agency regulations implementing NEPA. Similarly, significance has been measured
in terms of the action’s context and intensity.227 But, in July 2020, the CEQ revised
those regulations, omitting references to direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts.228 As
discussed in more detail below, these terms and the relevant case law remain applicable
to the BLM’s duties under NEPA’s statutory requirements and BLM’s own regulations,
notwithstanding the CEQ’s regulatory revisions.
If the effects of an agency action are not expected to be significant, an agency
may comply with NEPA through the preparation of a less extensive Environmental
Assessment (“EA”).229 Like an EIS, an EA describes the reasonably foreseeable
impacts associated with the proposed action, as well an analysis of alternatives and the
impacts of the alternatives.230 If the EA indicates that the impacts of a proposed action
are likely to be significant, the agency prepares an EIS that discusses those impacts in
greater detail.231 If the agency determines that the impacts fall below the significance
population density or growth rate, and related effects on air and water and other natural systems,
including ecosystems.”).
225
40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2019) (“Cumulative Impact is the impact on the environment which results
from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertake
such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively
significant actions taking place over a period of time.”)
226
40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(2019); 85 Fed. Reg. at 43369, to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2020).
227
40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.27 (2019) (defining “significantly” as requiring considerations of both context
and intensity); § 1508.8 (2019) (“Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but
collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.”).
228
Final Rule: Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304, 433331 (July 16, 2020) to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
Parts 1500, 1502, 1503, 1504, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1508, 1515, 1516, and 1518 (2020).
229
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2019); 43 C.F.R. § 46.300. See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43360, to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5.
230
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b); 43 C.F.R. § 46.310. See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43360, to be codified at 40
C.F.R. § 1501.5(c)(2).
231
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1); 43 C.F.R. § 46.300. See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43360, to be codified at
40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(a).
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threshold, the agency then prepares a finding of no significant impact on the
environment (“FONSI”).232
Critically, an agency can (and often does) impose mitigation measures to
reduce the degree of impacts below the significance threshold and thereby avoid EIS
preparation. Such approval documents are commonly referred to as Mitigated
FONSIs.233 As the CEQ explains, “[t]he appropriate mitigation measures can be
imposed as enforceable permit conditions, or adopted as part of the agency final
decision in the same manner mitigation measures can be adopted in the formal Record
of Decision that is required in EIS cases.”234 Agencies may also determine through
regulation that a class of actions is eligible for a Categorical Exclusion (“CE”) because
those actions are unlikely to have significant individual or cumulative environmental
effects.235 In “extraordinary circumstances,” actions otherwise covered by a
categorical exclusion may require further analysis.236 Thus, even actions that are
normally categorically excluded from NEPA, still “must be evaluated to determine
whether it meets any of the extraordinary circumstances.”237 BLM regulations provide
a list of “extraordinary circumstances,” including actions that “have direct relationship
to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant
environmental effects.”238

232

40 C.F.R. § 1508.13; 43 C.F.R. § 46.325. See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43360, to be codified at 40
C.F.R. § 1501.6(a)
233
See Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2003) (listing circuits that endorse the practice and
explaining: “This situation occurs when an agency or involved third party agrees to employ certain
mitigation measures that will lower the otherwise significant impacts of an activity on the
environment to a level of insignificance. In this way, a FONSI could be issued for an activity that
otherwise would require the preparation of a full-blown EIS.”). See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43361, to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6(c) (discussing Mitigated FONSIs).
234
Forty Most Asked Questions Regarding CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations,
46 Fed. Reg. 18026, 18038 (March 23, 1981). See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43361, to be codified at 40
C.F.R. § 1501.6(c) (“If the agency finds no significant impacts based on mitigation, the mitigated
finding of no significant impact shall state any enforceable mitigation requirements or commitments
that will be undertaken to avoid significant impacts.).
235
40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2019); 43 C.F.R. §§ 46.205 (2019). See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43360, to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4.
236
43 C.F.R. § 46.205(c)(a) (2019).
237
43 C.F.R. § 46.205(c)(1) (2019).
238
43 C.F.R. § 46.215.
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Recent case law applying NEPA in the context of climate change demonstrates
that courts are increasingly willing to delve into the factual record to ensure that
agencies have fulfilled NEPA’s statutory mandate by taking a “hard look” at the
environmental impacts of a proposed action. Additionally, despite a long tradition of
deference to agencies’ expertise, recent decisions have not extended that deference to
NEPA analyses that ignore the implications of the scientific consensus on climate
change. As the Tenth Circuit summarized, “We do not owe the BLM any greater
deference on the question at issue here because it does not involve ‘the frontiers of
science.’ The BLM acknowledged that climate change is a scientifically verified
reality. Climate science may be better in 2017 than in 2010 . . . but it is not a scientific
frontier.”239
The following sections explore these trends, after first discussing why the case
law is still relevant to the BLM’s duty to comply with NEPA, even if the Trump
Administration’s recent regulatory changes to CEQ regulations are upheld.
A.

Changes to the CEQ regulations do not amend Department of
Interior NEPA regulations, which incorporate the original CEQ
regulations.

The CEQ issues regulations that implement NEPA and that apply to all federal
agencies.240 In the summer of 2020, the CEQ proposed and finalized new regulations
to implement NEPA, and these revised regulations include sweeping changes to NEPA
practice. For example, the new regulations omit the term “cumulative impacts” and
delete section 1508.7, which defined that term.241 These changes do not, however,
eliminate the BLM’s duty to consider the cumulative effects in its management actions
239

WildEarth Guardians v. BLM, 870 F.3d 1222, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2017) (referring to the United
States Supreme Court standard for deference to agency decisions where decisions engage “scientific
frontiers” that are part of “barely emergent knowledge and technology.”).
240
See Exec. Order No. 11991, Relating to Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality
(May 24, 1977) (directing federal agencies to comply with the CEQ’s NEPA regulations). Other
agencies may promulgate their own NEPA regulations to address issues that are unique to their
NEPA practice. The Department of the Interior’s NEPA regulations, for example, are found in 43
C.F.R. part 46.
241
Final Rule: Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304, 433331 (July 16, 2020) to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
Parts 1500, 1502, 1503, 1504, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1508, 1515, 1516, and 1518 (2020).
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(including oil and gas permitting decisions) for at least two reasons. First, the duty to
consider indirect and cumulative environmental effects arises out NEPA’s statutory
requirements, which cannot be eliminated or restricted by regulation. Second, BLM
regulations still require an analysis of cumulative effects and those regulations remain
in force despite the CEQ’s actions.
The duty to broadly consider the environmental effects of an action, including
indirect and cumulative effects, arises out of NEPA’s statutory mandate, which cannot
be amended away by regulation.242 NEPA’s action forcing mandate is clear, EISs
“shall” include a discussion of “any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented.”243 The term “any” is broad and
necessarily includes indirect and cumulative effects. If Congress intended a narrow
analysis, it would have used narrow language. But Congress chose instead to
emphasize the comprehensive inquiry it intended by requiring agencies to “recognize
the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems.”244 “Worldwide”
and “long-range” problems are precisely the kinds of problems that rarely result from
one individual action, but instead reflect the combined effect of hundreds if not
thousands of smaller actions.
The Congressional Declaration of National
Environmental Policy, moreover, recognizes “the profound impact of man’s activities
on the interrelationship of all components of the natural environment, particularly the
profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial
expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances.”245
“[P]opulation growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource
exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances” are not individual
actions, but the product of multiple actions, and their environmental impacts can be
assessed only by considering the cumulative impacts of multiple separate and distinct
actions.
242

See In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[F]ederal agencies may not ignore
statutory mandates or prohibitions merely because of a policy disagreement with Congress.”);
California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129861 *63 (July
15, 2020) (quoting In re Aiken County).
243
42 U.S.C. § 4332(a)(C)(ii) (emphasis added).
244
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F).
245
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (emphasis added).
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The breadth of the mandate set forth in NEPA is consistent with legislative
discussions leading up to the Act’s passage. The Senate recognized that “Important
decisions concerning the use and the shape of man's future environment continue to be
made in small but steady increments which perpetuate rather than avoid the recognized
mistakes of previous decades. Today it is clear that we cannot continue on this
course.”246 A summary of findings published as a part of the Senate hearing in April
1969 also described cumulative effects when it explained one of the problems that
NEPA was intended to solve. “[A] major difficulty with the planning process: a series
of separate decisions, each individually justifiable, can, in the aggregate lead to results
which, had they been foreseen, would have been avoided.”247 Congress was clear,
agencies were not to lose sight of the forest by fixating on individual trees.
Such an interpretation is consistent with case law interpreting the Act. The CEQ first
promulgated regulations guiding NEPA’s implementation in 1978, eight years after
NEPA’s enactment. These regulations responded in part to a need to clarify the scope
of analysis required under NEPA, and CEQ’s regulations reflected the developing
judicial consensus. Relying on the Act alone, courts consistently found that NEPA’s
statutory language mandates broad consideration of the potential effects, including
cumulative effects, of a proposed federal action.248 In 1975, for example, the Second
Circuit found that the U.S. Navy erred in failing to consider the cumulative effect of
four separate river and harbor dredging projects that together would have dumped more
than 5 million cubic yards of contaminated spoils into Long Island Sound. As the court
explained:
[A]n agency may not . . . treat[] a project as an isolated ‘single-shot’
venture in the face of persuasive evidence that it is but one of several
246

Report of the Senate Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, Report to accompany S.
1075, S. Rept. 91-296 at 5 (July 9, 1969).
247
Hrg. April 16, 1969, Appx 1, p183 (Summary of Findings and Recommendations, Resources and
Man, Prepared by the Committee on Resources and Man, National Academy of Sciences- National
Research Council).
248
See generally, City of Rochester v. U.S. Postal Service, 541 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir. 1976); Nat.
Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir., 1975) (requiring a cumulative effects analysis
for dredging the Thames River), see also Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 891 (1st Cir. 1973) (requiring
a cumulative effects analysis), and Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 1975) (same).
20201205 Draft
47

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3756375

** Pre-Publication Draft **
32 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. __ (2021)
substantially similar operations, each of which will have the same
polluting effect in the same area. To ignore the prospective cumulative
harm under such circumstances could be to risk ecological disaster. As
was recognized by Congress at the time of passage of NEPA, a good
deal of our present air and water pollution has resulted from the
accumulation of small amounts of pollutants added to the air and water
by a great number of individual, unrelated sources. ‘Important
decisions concerning the use and the shape of man’s future
environment continue to be made in small but steady increments which
perpetuate rather than avoid the recognized mistakes of previous
decades.’ S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91 Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969). NEPA
was, in large measure, an attempt by Congress to instill in the
environmental decision-making process a more comprehensive
approach so that long term and cumulative effects of small and
unrelated decisions could be recognized, evaluated and either avoided,
mitigated, or accepted as the price to be paid for the major federal
action under consideration.249
Similarly, the Supreme Court agreed that NEPA’s statutory language required a
comprehensive analysis that includes cumulative effects. “[W]hen several proposals .
. . that will have cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are
pending concurrently before an agency, their environmental consequences must be
considered together.”250 Thus, the requirement to consider indirect and cumulative
effects arises from NEPA’s statutory language, and cannot be swept away by a
regulatory amendment.
249

Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1975). See also, Swain v. Brinegar,
517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975) (“NEPA is clearly intended to focus concern on the ‘big picture’
relative to environmental problems. It recognizes that each ‘limited’ federal project is part of a large
mosaic of thousands of similar projects and that cumulative effects can and must be considered on
an ongoing basis.”); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1322 (8th Cir.
1974) (“NEPA is concerned with indirect effects as well as direct effects. There has been increasing
recognition that man and all other life on this earth may be significantly affected by actions which
on the surface appear insignificant.”); and Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973) (agency’s
“piecemeal” analysis of urban renewal program violated NEPA).
250
Kleppe v. Sierra Club 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976).
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The second reason that caselaw interpreting the BLM’s obligation to consider
cumulative effects is still relevant is more technical and specific. The Department of
the Interior’s (“DOI”) own regulations still explicitly require a cumulative effects
analysis. To ensure that the environmental consequences of an action are properly
considered Congress directed “to the fullest extent possible” that “all agencies of the
Federal Government shall . . . “develop methods and procedures . . . which will insure
that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given
appropriate consideration in decisionmaking.”251 Consistent with the statute’s
mandate, the DOI adopted implementing regulations that apply to the BLM.252
The DOI regulations incorporate by reference the implementing NEPA
regulations originally drafted by the Council on Environmental Quality in 1978.253
Section 46.20 of the DOI regulations provides a chart demonstrating the correlation
between DOI regulations and CEQ regulations.254 Some DOI regulations stand alone,
without a corresponding CEQ regulation.255 Other DOI regulations build upon the
corresponding CEQ regulation and do not make sense alone. For example, DOI
regulation section 46.115 entitled “Consideration of past actions in the analysis of
cumulative effects” corresponds to CEQ regulation 1508.7 entitled “Cumulative
impact.”256 Section 46.115 (DOI regulation) states: “[W]hen considering the effects of
past actions as part of a cumulative effects analysis, [bureaus] must analyze the effects
in accordance with 40 C.F.R. §1508.7 [“cumulative impact”] and in accordance with
relevant guidance issued by the Council on Environmental Quality.”257 Although the
CEQ published changes to its regulations, the Department of Interior has not begun
rulemaking to amend its NEPA regulations. This begs the question, which version of
CEQ regulations is incorporated by reference to the BLM’s NEPA regulations?

251

Id. § 4332(B).
43 C.F.R. § 46.10 et seq.
253
Id. § 46.20 (This part supplements, and is to be used in conjunction with, the CEQ regulations
except where it is inconsistent with other statutory requirements.”). The CEQ Regulations were
finalized at 43 Fed. Reg. 56003 (Nov. 29, 1978).
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id. (corresponding 43 C.F.R. § 46.115 (2019) with 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2019)).
257
Id. (the regulation specifically refers to a memo dated June 24, 2005, “or any superseding Council
on Environmental Quality Guidance”).
252
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Thankfully, the Office of Federal Register has encountered this problem before
and drafted a regulation to address it. “Incorporation by reference of a publication is
limited to the edition of the publication that is approved. Future amendments or
revisions of the publication are not included.”258
This approach parallels the relevant rule of statutory construction. The socalled “Lazarus Rule” holds that “where one statute refers to another and incorporates
it, which incorporated statute is subsequently repealed, the statute repealed . . . remains
in force so far as the adopting statute is concerned.”259 In the context of administrative
law, this principle ensures that the requirements of notice and comment rulemaking are
satisfied for each agency and each regulated public. One agency does not have
authority to amend another agency’s regulations, which is what would happen if
dynamic incorporation were allowed.260 The Administrative Procedure Act is clear:
“[E]ach agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for
the guidance of the public . . . substantive rules of general applicability adopted as
authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general
applicability formulated and adopted by the agency.”261 Each agency must “separately
state and currently publish . . . each amendment, revision, or repeal” of its rules and
policies.262 In other words, the DOI must amend its own regulations through notice
and comment if it desires to eliminate the term “cumulative impacts” The DOI cannot
sidestep the Administrative Procedure Act by dynamically incorporating another
agency’s rules. This requirement fulfills the predictability expected from the regulated
public, and it ensures that changes wrought by one agency are not foisted onto another.

258

1 C.F.R. § 51.1(f) (2020).
Fisher v. Grand Island, 239 Neb. 929, 932 (Neb. 1992) (internal quotations omitted).
Presumably the name arose from the colorful introduction to the dissent provided in Fisher: “Not
since ‘Lazarus, come forth’ has there been such a summons for the dead to associate with the living.”
Id. at 934.
260
See generally Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open Government Age, 36
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 131, (Winter 2013) (explaining regulatory use of incorporation by reference
and demonstrating that dynamic incorporation is legally prohibited in the rulemaking context
because it violates the principles of notice and comment).
261
5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1)(D).
262
Id. at § 552(a)(2)(E).
259
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“These requirements exist, in part, because markets and industries rely on stable
regulations.”263
Thus, notwithstanding the recent regulatory changes made by the CEQ, unless
and until the DOI revises its own regulations, the BLM is still bound by the 1978
version of the CEQ regulations that are incorporated into DOI’s regulations. Those
regulations, and relevant case law, still require an assessment of indirect and
cumulative effects.
B.

The cumulative impacts discussion requires an analysis of
contribution to climate change.

The original CEQ NEPA regulations defined “cumulative impact” as “the
impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action
when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless
of what agency (federal or non-federal) or person undertakes such other actions.
Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant
actions taking place over a period of time.”264 DOI regulations adopt and build upon
this definition. Looking toward the future, “reasonably foreseeable” is defined as
“federal and non-federal activities not yet undertaken, but sufficiently likely to occur,
that a Responsible Official of ordinary prudence would take such activities into account
in reaching a decision.”265 Looking toward the past, DOI bureaus must include the
effects of past actions as part of the cumulative effect analysis and “analyze the effects
in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7” and relevant guidance.266
263

California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129861 *40
(July 15, 2020).
264
40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2019).
265
43 C.F.R. § 46.30 (2019) (explaining further that reasonably foreseeable future actions that “must
be taken into account in the analysis of cumulative impact include, but are not limited to, activities
for which there are existing decisions, funding, or proposals identified by the bureau”).
266
Identifying the relevant guidance is also a challenge. In 2010, the Council on Environmental
Quality issued draft guidance instructing agencies on how to incorporate climate change into NEPA
analyses. That guidance was finalized in 2016. Council on Environmental Quality, Exec. Office of
the President, Memorandum of Federal Departments and Agencies, “Final Guidance for Federal
Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of
Climate Change in NEPA Reviews (2016), https://perma.cc/QP7E-7PUM. Then it was withdrawn
in 2017 by Executive Order 13783. Claiming to favor “clean and safe development of our Nation’s
vast energy resources,” the Order lacked factual underpinnings contained in prior guidance and
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Climate change is “precisely the type” of cumulative environmental problem
that NEPA was intended to address.267 The importance of considering GHG emissions
as part of the cumulative effects analysis is reinforced by a growing tide of court
decisions that are harshly critical of a lax cumulative effects analyses of climate change
impacts. For example, in Indigenous Environmental Network, the agency failed to
analyze the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions the Keystone XL pipeline in
combination with other pipelines being built.268 More recently, in WildEarth
Guardians v. United States, the same court found that the BLM “failed to give a
sufficiently detailed catalogue of past, present, and future projects” where it declined
to quantify the immediate and downstream GHG emissions associated with several
leases that were issued separately.269 In both instances, these errors required the
agencies to revisit their NEPA analysis.
Project-specific quantification is not enough, the BLM must put the emissions
in context. For example, in WildEarth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Management, the
BLM quantified the greenhouse gas emissions anticipated from several oil and gas
lease sales and calculated what percentage of national-level and state-level emissions

provided no analysis as to how agencies should address climate change. Because of this analytical
gap, courts and litigants continue to reference the rescinded guidance consistent with its power to
persuade. See, e.g., San Juan Citizens Alliance v. United States BLM, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1243
n. 5 (D.N.M. 2018) (explaining history of guidance and concluding “to the extent the reasoning is
logically sound and consistent with case law, the Court finds it persuasive and worthy of citation”);
accord AquAlliance v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 287 F. Supp. 3d 969, 1028 n. 31 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 15, 2018). See also Mead Corp. v. United States, 533 U.S. 218, 228, 235 (2001)(recognizing
that where a regulatory scheme is highly detailed and the agency can bring specialized experience
to bear on subtle questions, an agency document may have the “power to persuade” according to
“the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements”).
267
Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Admin., 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“The impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is precisely the kind of cumulative
impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to conduct. Any given rule . . . might have an
‘individually minor’ effect on the environment, but these rules are ‘collectively significant actions
taking place over a period of time.’” (citing 40 C.F.R. §1508.7).
268
Indigenous Envtl. Network v. United States Dept. of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 577 (D. Mont.
2018).
269
WildEarth Guardians v. United States, CV-18-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77409 (D.
Mont. May 1, 2020).
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the new emissions would comprise.270 The court held that this recitation fell short of
providing a meaningful cumulative impacts assessment, which requires that
quantification to be put into the context of state and nation-wide emissions.271 “The
global nature of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions means that any single
lease sale or BLM project will likely make up a negligible percent of state and nationwide greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, if BLM ever hopes to determine the true impact
of its projects on climate change, it can do so only by looking at projects in combination
with each other, not simply in the context of state and nation-wide emissions.”272 In
other words, a permitting official of “ordinary prudence”273 would consider the national
context of past and future GHG emissions relevant when permitting an incremental
increase.
Courts have also rejected arguments attempting to skirt the cumulative impacts
analysis by asserting that individual leasing decisions result in negligible GHG
emissions. For example, in San Juan Citizens Alliance v. U.S. Bureau of Land
Management, the federal court in the District of New Mexico concluded, “Without
further explanation, the facile conclusion that this particular [GHG emission] impact is
minor and therefore ‘would not produce climate change impacts that differ from the
No Action Alternative,’ is insufficient.”274 Similarly, in WildEarth Guardians v.
United States Bureau of Land Management, the District of Montana rejected the
BLM’s segmented analysis of several individual oil and gas lease sales.275 As it
explained, “The cumulative impacts analysis was designed precisely to determine
whether ‘a small amount here, a small amount there, and still more at another point
could add up to something with a much greater impact.’”276 The court rejected several
BLM arguments that assessing the specific impacts of GHG emissions from a specific
lease sale was impossible due to the global nature of climate change.277 “[E]ven though
270

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77409 at *27, *34.
Id. at *34.
272
Id. at *31.
273
43 C.F.R. § 46.30 (2019).
274
San Juan Citizens Alliance v. US Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1248 (D.N.M.
2018).
275
WildEarth Guardians, Case No. CV-18-73-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist LEXIS 77409 *26 (D.
Mont. May 1, 2020) (“BLM provided no catalogue here and little analysis to show the combined
environmental impacts.”).
276
Id. at *31 (quoting Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. BLM, 387 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2004)).
277
Id. at *30.
271
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BLM cannot ascertain exactly how all of these projects contribute to climate change
impacts felt in the project area, it knows that less greenhouse-gas emissions equals less
climate change.”278 These decisions demonstrate judicial awareness of the scientific
consensus that in the context of climate change, every incremental increase of GHG
emissions is cumulatively significant.
The cumulative effects analysis also requires agencies to consider the effects
of actions outside of agency control.279 The Ninth Circuit applied this requirement in
the context of climate change when requiring the National Highway Transportation
Administration to provide contextual information in determining whether vehicle
emission standards would contribute to climate change. “[T]he fact that climate change
is largely a global phenomenon that includes actions that are outside of the agency’s
control does not release the agency from the duty of assessing the effects of its actions
on global warming within the context of other actions that also affect global
warming.”280 To emphasize that even modest contributions of greenhouse gases could
be considered significant in the context of climate change, the court cited a phrase from
a dissent by Judge Wald on the D.C. Circuit in 1990. “‘[W]e cannot afford to ignore
even modest contributions to global warming. If global warming is the result of the
cumulative contributions of myriad sources, any one modest in itself, is there not a
danger of losing the forest by closing our eyes to the felling of the individual trees?’”281
Putting a project in a regional context this way serves NEPA’s primary purpose of
informing the relevant decisionmaker “whether, or how, to alter the program to lessen
cumulative impacts on climate change.”282
Some agencies have sought to avoid analyzing the consequences of highemissions scenarios by characterizing that trajectory as a “worst case scenario.” NEPA
does not require agencies to prepare a “worst case analysis.”283 However, as the cases
278

Id. at *30-31 (emphasis added).
Id. (defining cumulative impacts to include reasonably foreseeable future actions “regardless of
what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions”).
280
Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1217 (9th Cir.
2008).
281
Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Wald, C.J.,
dissenting) overruled on other grounds by Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir.
1996)).
282
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
283
See 51 Fed. Reg. 15618 (April 25, 1986) (rescinding the requirement to prepare a worst case
analysis).
279
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discussed above demonstrate, the cumulative effects analysis requires context.
Climate change models use scenarios to provide the context necessary to assess risks
related to different emission trajectories.284 For example, the world faces less risks if
global warming is limited to 1.5°C through immediate and disciplined adoption of
GHG emission reduction strategies than if temperatures are allowed to rise
unchecked.285 In AquAlliance, the court rejected the agency’s attempt to characterize
a high emissions scenario as a “worst case” scenario. As the court explained, the
rejected high “emissions scenario is not a ‘worst case’ scenario, at least not in the way
that term is generally understood, in part because the record reflects that recent carbon
dioxide emissions have, in fact, been higher than the [high] emissions scenario.”286 The
court’s reasoning is logical and compelling. An agency cannot ignore realistic
projections, adopt a model using optimistic warming scenarios, and then make their
aspirational assessment even less likely by contributing to a higher warming scenario
by increasing GHG emissions.
In summary, the context of climate change elevates the significance of
incremental increases in GHG emissions. Even though any single lease sale is likely
to make up a negligible percent of state-wide greenhouse gas emissions, if the BLM
ever hopes to determine the true impact of its project on climate change, it can only do
so by looking at projects in combination.287 That includes taking responsibility for the
24 percent of national emissions that arise out of fossil fuel development on federal
land and for the cumulative effect of increasing that percentage of emissions. Just as
the BLM “knows that less greenhouse-gas emissions equals less climate change,”288 it
also knows that more greenhouse gas emissions equal more climate change. In order
to achieve an emissions trajectory that will limit global warming to 1.5°C, the U.S.
284

But see Safari Club Int’l v. Salazar (In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section
4(d) Rule Litig.), 709 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cr. 2012) (noting FWS observation that the different model
projections provided in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report are “fairly consistent” until midcentury “because the state-of-the-art climate models used in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report
have known physics connecting increases in greenhouse gas concentrations to temperature increases
through radiation processes, and the greenhouse gas levels used in the models’ emissions scenarios
follow similar trends until around 2040-2050” (internal alterations omitted)).
285
See generally IPCC 1.5° Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9.
286
Id. at 1029-1030.
287
Compare WildEarth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Management, CV-18-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77409 *31 (D. Mont. May 1, 2020).
288
Id. at 30-31.
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must make immediate emission reductions and achieve net zero by 2050. Each step
toward a higher emissions trajectory has the cumulative effect of exacerbating climate
change. This acknowledgement should be part of the cumulative effects analysis
because it provides context by demonstrating the “incremental impact of the action
when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.”289 As
Judge Wald recognized in 1990, failing to recognize that individually modest emissions
contribute to climate change presents the danger of “losing the forest by closing our
eyes to the felling of the individual trees.”290
C.

Upstream and Downstream GHG Emissions Related to Fossil Fuel
Development Are Reasonably Foreseeable and Must Be Disclosed.

Downstream combustion of fossil fuels is increasingly recognized as
“reasonably foreseeable” when assessing the effects of a proposed action and therefore
part of the cumulative effects analysis. In addition to the emissions occurring at the
exploration and production phases, multiple courts hold that NEPA requires the BLM
to also consider the “indirect effect” of downstream emissions resulting from refining
and consuming the fuel after it is sold.291 The D.C. Circuit explained this requirement
289

40 C.F.R 1508.7 (2019).
City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Wald, C.J., dissenting)
overruled on other grounds by Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ctr.
For Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1217 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Judge Wald’s dissent).
291
See San Juan Citizens Alliance v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227,
1242-1243 (D. N.M. 2018) (“[I]t is erroneous to fail to consider, at the earliest stage feasible the
environmental consequences of downstream combustion of the coal, oil, and gas resources
potentially open to development under the proposed agency action” (internal quotations omitted)).
W. Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. CV 16-21 GF-BMM, 2018 WL
1475470 *13 (D. Mont. March 26, 2018) (holding that BLM must consider downstream combustion
of coil, oil, and gas resources potentially open to development in RMPs); Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy
Reg. Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that because greenhouse gas
emissions are an “indirect effect of authorizing this [pipeline project] which [the agency] could
reasonably foresee” the agency must provide a quantitative estimate of downstream emissions or
explain why it could not do so); Montana Envtl. Inco. Ctr. v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining, No CV
15-106-M-DWM, 2017 WL 5047901, *3 (D. Mont. Nov. 3, 2017) (holding that GHG emissions
caused by burning coal extracted from a coal mine are indirect effects of coal trains); Dine Citizens
Against Ruining Our Env’t v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation & Enforcement, 82 F.
Supp. 3d 1201, 1213 (D. Colo. 2015) (finding that coal combustion are indirect effects of expanding
coal mine) vacated as moot by 643 Fed. Appx. 799 (10th Cir. 2016); WildEarth Guardians v. United
290
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in Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: “[G]reenhouse gas
emissions are an indirect effect of authorizing this project, which FERC could
reasonably foresee, and which the agency has legal authority to mitigate.”292 The court
recognized that the quantification was important because it “would permit the agency
to compare the emissions from this project to emissions from other projects, to total
emissions from the state or region, and to regional or national emission control
goals.”293 That quantification provides an opportunity for informed public comment,
as well as a meaningful assessment of mitigation measures.
Arguments that it is too speculative to quantify anticipated downstream GHG
emissions from fossil fuel production are losing credibility. Most permitting processes
include a reasonably foreseeable development scenario (RFDS) setting forth estimated
well or mine production, which can be used to anticipate downstream emissions.294
The RFDS is a “long-term projection of oil and gas exploration, development,
States Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enforcement, 104 F. Supp. 3d 1208, 1229-30 (D.
Colo. 2015) (downstream coal combustion is an indirect effect of mining plan) order vacated and
appeal dismissed as moot by 652 Fed. Appx. 717 (10th Cir. 2016).
292
867 F.3d at 1374.
293
Id.
294
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (holding
that because FERC had already estimated how much gas the pipelines would transport, there was
no reason why that number could not be used to estimate GHG emissions); Citizens for a Healthy
Cmty v. United States BLM, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1237 (D. Colo. 2019) (“Simply put, an agency
cannot rely upon production estimates while simultaneously claiming that it would be too
speculative to rely on the predicted emissions from those same production estimates.”); Wilderness
Workshop, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 1155-56 (“It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to
use estimates of energy output for one portion of an EIS, but then state that it is too speculative to
forecast effects based on those very outputs.”); High Country Conservation Advocates v. United
States Forest Service, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1196 (D. Colo. 2014) (“The agency cannot—in the same
EIS—provide detailed estimates of the amount of coal to be mined and simultaneously claim that it
would be too speculative to estimate emissions from coal that ‘may or may not be produced’ from
mines that ‘may or may not be developed.’ The two positions are nearly impossible to reconcile.”);
W. Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. CV 16-21-GF-BMM, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49635 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-35849 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2018)
(“In light of the degree of foreseeability and specificity of information available to the agency while
completing the EIS, NEPA requires BLM to consider in the EIS the environmental consequences of
the downstream combustion of the coal, oil and gas resources potentially open to development under
these RMPs. Without such analysis, the EIS fails to ‘foster informed decisionmaking’ as required
by NEPA” (emphasis and quotations in original)).
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production and reclamation activity in a defined area for a specified time”295 and should
be included in the NEPA analysis.296 The RFDS is important because it “serves as a
baseline for identifying and quantifying direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of oil
and gas activity.297
The BLM cannot skirt its responsibility to consider upstream and downstream
GHG emissions by claiming that if it rejects or limits fossil fuel development in one
location, the minerals will simply be developed elsewhere. The Tenth Circuit expressly
rejected this argument and the BLM’s conclusion that expanding two coal mines to
extend the life of the mines would have no consequential impact on carbon dioxide
emissions.298 “This long logical leap presumes that either the reduced supply will have
no impact on price, or that any increase in price will not make other forms of energy
more attractive and decrease coal’s share of the energy mix, even slightly.”299 The
court found that this assumption was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion
because it “defeated NEPA’s purpose . . . of informed decisionmaking and informed
public comment.”300 Similarly, the Federal District Court in Montana recently rejected
an argument that a coal mine expansion would not contribute an increase to GHG
emissions because the coal would be developed elsewhere. The court described the
argument as “illogical,” noting that it put a “thumb on the scale by inflating the benefits
of the action while minimizing the impacts,” which is the kind of inaccurate
information that would defeat the purpose of a NEPA analysis.301
Cases such as these demonstrate that existing law already imposes a duty on
the BLM to quantify anticipated GHG emissions, including the downstream emissions,
from every oil and gas well. Existing case law also recognizes that the purpose of
quantifying emissions is to provide a meaningful assessment of mitigation measures,
including GHG emission mitigation, during the NEPA analysis.

295

R Terms, “Reasonably Foreseeable Development Scenario (RFDS), 8 Williams & Meyers, Oil
and Gas Law Scope (2019) (citing Deborah Reichman, 173 IBLA 149, 157 (2007).
296
BLM Manual § 1601.06(a)(3).
297
Id.
298
See, e.g. WildEarth Guardians v. US BLM, 870 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir. 2017)
299
Id
300
Id. at 1237.
301
Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. United States Office of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1098 (D.
Mont. 2017).
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D.

Courts recognize that old data is inadequate data.

Although agencies may tier their EISs to earlier documents in order to avoid
repetitive discussions of the same issues,302 courts are recognizing that old data
provided in outdated resource management plans or EISs does not satisfy NEPA if the
data does not incorporate accurate climate trends. When tiering to other NEPA
documents, DOI regulations require the analysis to include a finding that the
“conditions and environmental effects described in the broader NEPA document are
still valid or address any exceptions.”303 In relation to climate change, this standard
cannot be satisfied if the earlier document relies on outdated climate assumptions.
In Western Organization of Resource Councils v. BLM, the court found that the
BLM arbitrarily restricted the range of alternatives in a coal leasing analysis by relying
on Resource Management Plans that were drafted in 1985 and 1996. By cribbing its
alternatives analysis, the BLM also failed to consider the impacts of climate change.304
Although other BLM documents generically acknowledged climate change at a
departmental level, the BLM did not update its coal leasing analysis to include climate
change concerns or consider whether those concerns justified restricting new coal
leases.305 The court found that the omission arbitrarily restricted the alternatives
analysis and did not deserve deference. “Without such consideration, the BLM could
not make a reasoned choice as to whether foreclosing development on additional
acreage would serve its multiple use mandate and would address concerns that may
arise from the changing conditions . . . including climate change.”306
Similarly, in National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries, the
District of Oregon held that “relying on data that is too stale to carry the weight
assigned to it may be arbitrary and capricious,” particularly where it restricts the

302

40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.20(2019); § 1508.28; 43 C.F.R. § 46.140 (2019). See also 85 Fed. Reg. at
43360, to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.11 (discussing tiering).
303
43 C.F.R. § 46.140 (2019) (“A NEPA document that tiers to another broader NEPA document
in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 must include a finding that the conditions and environmental
effects described in the broader NEPA document are still valid or address any exceptions.”).
304
Western Organization of Resource Councils v. BLM , Case No. CV 16-21-GF-BMM, 2018 WL
147570 *7 (D. Mont. 2018) (“The 1985 Miles City RMP and the 1996 Miles City RMP failed to
consider the impacts of climate change.”).
305
Id. at *9.
306
Id. at *9.
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alternatives analysis.307 In that case, the agency relied upon an EIS drafted in the 1990s
that failed to incorporate recent climate science.308 Hearkening back to NEPA’s
purpose, the court recognized that a thorough alternatives analysis “may be able to
break through any logjam that simply maintains the precarious status quo.”309
These court decisions have implications for the BLM. The scenario addressed
in Western Organization and National Wildlife Federation is not uncommon. Many of
BLM’s land use plans date to the 1980’s and 1990’s, and the majority of BLM’s
existing plans do not take into account knowledge and obligations around climate
change that have been available for more than a decade.310 New data regarding the
effects, intensity, and urgency of global warming must be included in the BLM’s NEPA
analyses, including permitting decisions. A comprehensive assessment of climaterelated impacts may break the logjam to considering new and innovative management
strategies for fulfilling FLPMA’s multiple use mandate. The BLM cannot continue to
rely on stale data to maintain the precarious status quo.
V.

The BLM Should Develop a Comprehensive GHG Mitigation Plan for Its
Oil and Gas Permitting Decisions.

In order to find a more appropriate balance between the risks of climate change
and federal energy development, the BLM could incorporate a net zero mitigation
requirement into its fossil fuel permitting decisions. This approach would allow
continued energy development without ignoring climate change. A net-zero
requirement on all new development activity would be more consistent with the BLM’s
responsibility of managing various resources “without permanent impairment of the
307

National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Services 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 875
(D. Or. 2016).
308
Id. (noting that “significant developments in the scientific information relating to climate change
and its effects . . . has improved such that the environmental impact statements prepared in the 1990s
are neither current nor sufficient”).
309
Id. at 876 (holding that the purpose of a comprehensive NEPA analysis is to “allow, even
encourage, new and innovative solutions to be developed, discussed, and considered”)
310
See e.g., Bureau of Land Management, Utah Planning and NEPA, Plans in Effect,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/planning-and-nepa/plans-in-development/utah (last visited May 27,
2020) (identifying plans within Utah that date to 1980 and fifteen plans that are more than twenty
years old). See also, Bureau of Land Management, New Mexico Planning and NEPA, Plans in
Effect,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/planning-and-nepa/plans-in-development/new-mexico
(identifying plans in effect that date to 1986 and nine plans that are more than twenty years old).
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productivity of the land and quality of the environment”311 because it would help
achieve the emissions trajectory necessary to keep global warming below 1.5°C. A
net-zero requirement would also “prevent unnecessary or undue degradation” by
avoiding an increase in GHG emissions that will exacerbate climate change and its
effects on public lands. Finally, a net-zero requirement would be more consistent with
FLPMA’s multi-generational investment horizon. It would also strike a more
appropriate balance of resource uses to meet “the present and future needs of the
American people”312
The BLM could incorporate a net-zero requirement without waiting for
Congress to make a legislative change. The existing oil and gas leasing structure
provides the BLM with ample authority to mitigate adverse effects at multiple stages
of the exploration and production process. The following discussion focuses on the oil
and gas permitting process, the same principles could apply to other fossil fuel
permitting decisions.
A.

The BLM Should Impose a Moratorium on Oil and Gas Leasing
Until It Has a Comprehensive GHG Mitigation Plan.

The BLM has authority to impose a moratorium on oil and gas while it develops
a comprehensive GHG mitigation policy as part of the land use planning process.313 A
moratorium is simply a pause on leasing and permitting decisions that would allow the
BLM to develop a comprehensive strategy that is responsive to the climate data
currently being ignored. The BLM’s authority to impose a moratorium on oil and gas

311

43 U.S.C. §1702(c).
Id. (defining multiple use to include “management of the public lands and their various resource
values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs
of the American people”).
313
United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 419 (1931) (upholding moratorium on
oil and gas leasing); John D. Leshy, Interior’s Authority to Curb Fossil Fuel Leasing, 49 ELI 10631,
10631-32 (July 2019) [hereinafter Leshy, Interior’s Authority to Curb Fossil Fuel Leasing]; Michael
Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope
of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 118-119 (2017) [hereinafter Burger & Wentz,
Downstream and Upstream GHG Emissions] (discussing statutory and precedential authority to
impose moratoriums on coal and oil and gas leases).
312
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leasing arises from its overarching duty, articulated in FLPMA, to manage multiple
uses without permanently impairing resources under its care.314
The argument that BLM lacks discretion to pause oil and gas lease sales
elevates form over function and ignores the relevant facts. The Mineral Leasing Act
states, “All lands subject to disposition under this Act . . . may be leased by the
Secretary.”315 The statute then articulates procedures for leasing lands. Among other
things, the procedures state that “lease sales shall be held for each State where eligible
lands are available at least quarterly and more frequently if the Secretary of the Interior
determines such sales are necessary.”316 Some people have argued that this
requirement prohibits the BLM from imposing a moratorium on oil and gas leasing.317
This argument focuses myopically on the phrase “shall be held quarterly” to the
exclusion of context. First, the Secretary has authority to determine which lands are
“eligible” and that determination must be made consistent with the multiple use
mandate. The statute qualifies the requirement to hold quarterly lease sales with the
predicate “where eligible lands are available,” suggesting that at some point and in
some places, eligible lands may not be available. Additionally, BLM’s permitting
decisions under the Mineral Leasing Act are governed by its statutory duties under
FLPMA, not the other way around. FLPMA states explicitly, “In managing the public
lands the Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”318 Where holding quarterly
sales may result in unnecessary or undue degradation by locking in decades of
unmitigated GHG emissions based on outdated scientific assumptions, this provision
grants BLM discretion to take a pause on the quarterly sales.
Additionally, a moratorium is simply an adjustment to the pace and structure
of development. The Mineral Leasing Act vests the BLM with discretion to manage
314

Other provisions further emphasize this duty. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2018) (“In
managing the public lands, the BLM shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”).
315
43 U.S.C. § 226(a).
316
43 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A).
317
See, e.g., Western Energy Alliance v. Jewell, No. 1:16-CV-00912, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5574
(D.N.M. Jan. 13, 2017) (holding that plaintiffs, Western Energy Alliance, had standing to claim that
BLM had a statutory non-discretionary duty to hold quarterly lease sales when eligible lands were
available).
318
43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
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the pace and structure of mineral leasing, including suspension of operations in the
interest of conservation.319 The BLM has relied upon its discretion under FLPMA and
the MLA to adjust the pace of oil and gas leasing in the past.320 Additionally, federal
courts have recognized that the phrase “in the interest of conservation” used in the
MLA includes the prevention of environmental harm.321 In a slightly different context,
involving routes across public lands, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the BLM must
have discretion to suspend operations in order to complete the necessary analysis for
land use planning where there is a threat of degradation. “Because the RMP revision
process is much more time-consuming than enacting a temporary closure order, the
BLM could not effectively respond to resource degradation only through the formal
planning process.”322 The same is true with regards to fossil fuel development. The
pace and structure of the current leasing system allows for cumulatively significant
increases in GHG emissions despite an urgent need to reduce national emissions in
order to avoid widespread resource degradation. Every incremental increase in GHG
emissions exacerbates the climate change. Pausing oil and gas leasing in order to
develop a comprehensive GHG mitigation strategy is within the BLM’s discretion and

319

See 30 U.S.C. § 209 (“In the event the Secretary of the Interior, in the interest of conservation,
shall direct or shall assent to the suspension of operations and production under any lease granted
under the terms of this Act. . . .”; 43 C.F.R. § 3103.4-4(a) (“A suspension of all operations and
production may be directed or consented to by the Authorized Officer only in the interest of
conservation of natural resources.”); see also Burger & Wentz, Downstream and Upstream GHG
Emissions supra note 362 at n. 26-27 (listing provisions in the Mineral Leasing Act that vest the
BLM with discretion to manage the pace and structure of oil and gas leasing); see also Leshy,
Interior’s Authority to Curb Fossil Fuel Leasing supra note 97 at 10631-32 (challenging Secretary
Bernhardt’s suggestion that the BLM lacks authority to impose a moratorium by reviewing the
discretionary language in 30 U.S.C. §226(a) combined with precedent upholding a moratorium and
subsequent legislative history of the Mineral Leasing Act).
320
See Dep’t of Interior, IM 2016-143 Implementation of Greater Sage-Grouse Resource
Management Plan Revisions or Amendments- Oil & Gas Leasing and Development Sequential
Prioritization 7 n. 10 (Sept. 1, 2016).
321
Copper Valley Machine Works, Inc. v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hoyl v.
Babbit, 129 F.3d 1377, 1380 (10th Cir. 1997).
322
Utah Shared Access Alliance v. Carpenter, 463 F.3d 1125, 1136 (10th Cir. 2006) (BLM closure
of land to ORV use in order to avoid undue degradation during the land use planning process was
not “de facto planning” that required an Environmental Assessment and was within BLM’s authority
and responsibility under FLPMA).
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will allow the BLM to fulfill its statutory mandate of multiple uses “without permanent
impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the environment.”323
The BLM’s responsibility to inventory public resources in order to make
informed and strategic land use decisions provides further justification for a
moratorium.324 FLPMA recognized that “the national interest will be best realized if
the public lands and their resources are periodically systematically inventoried and
their present and future use is projected through a land use planning process.”325
FLPMA imposed a mandatory obligation on the BLM to inventory public lands and
their resources and other values. This inventory “shall be kept current so as to reflect
changes in conditions and to identify new and emerging resource and other values.” 326
Based on this inventory, the BLM must then “develop, maintain, and when appropriate,
revise land use plans” directing the management of public lands.327
Existing oil and gas lease statistics indicate that a pause is needed to update
planning for oil and gas development. The BLM maintains a website publishing
statistical information relating to oil and gas leasing on federal lands.328 Reviewing the
most recent statistics reveals two notable trends. First, the BLM offers a supply of land
available for oil and gas leasing that is significantly higher than the demand. In 2018,
the BLM offered 3,073 parcels (representing 12,836,231 acres) for lease.329 But the
BLM only received bids for 1,336 parcels (representing 1,351,287 acres).330 This
means that less than one half of the parcels (43%) and only 10 percent of the acreage
323

43 U.S.C. § 1702(c).
43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (“The Secretary shall prepare and maintain on a continuing basis an
inventory of all public lands and their resource and other values. . . . This inventory shall be kept
current so as to reflect changes in conditions and identify new and emerging resource and other
values.”); see also Dep’t of Interior, Secretarial Order 3338 Discretionary Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement to Modernize the Federal Coal Program (Jan. 15, 2016) (justifying
a pause on the issuance of new federal coal leases to avoid “locking in for decades the future
development of large quantities of coal under current rates and terms that the PEIS may ultimately
determine to be less than optimal”).
325
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(2) and z- 1711(a).
326
43 U.S.C. § 1711(a).
327
43 U.S.C. § 1712(a).
328
BLM, Oil and Gas Statistics https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-andgas/oil-and-gas-statistics [hereinafter BLM Statistics Website].
329
BLM Statistics Website supra note 389 at Table 15 (Oil and Gas Lease Sales, Fiscal Year 2018).
330
Id.
324
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put up for leasing received a bid. In other words, the current supply of leasable land
far outpaces demand.
Additionally, many leases have not been brought into production. In 2018, the
total number of leases was 38,147 (representing 25,552,475 acres).331 In contrast, there
were only 24,028 producing leases (representing 12,794,553 acres).332 This indicates
that there are 14,119 leases across 12,757,922 acres (almost 20,000 square-miles, or
more than Vermont and New Hampshire combined) that have been leased but not
developed. If each of these already-leased parcels were put into production, it would
increase the number of producing leases by 37 percent. Therefore, the existing store
of oil and gas leases will already impose a potentially significant, but not-yet-analyzed
increase in GHG emissions. The significance of those emissions, and methods for
mitigating those emissions should be analyzed before the BLM increases that supply
even further. In light of these facts, instituting a pause on lease sales is justified and
consistent with the BLM’s duty avoid permanent impairment of resources and prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation.
B.

The BLM Should Use Its Statutory Mitigation Authority To
Require GHG Mitigation for New Oil and Gas Development
Activity.

The BLM has broad authority under FLPMA, NEPA, and the Mineral Leasing
Act (MLA) to identify and implement actions that mitigate adverse effects of a project,
including oil and gas leasing activities.333 The BLM also has contractual authority
under the Standard Mineral Lease Form to require oil and gas lessees to incorporate
mitigation measures as a Condition of Approval for drilling operations. The BLM
could use these authorities to identify GHG emissions as an adverse impact and require
operators to mitigate that impact by avoiding, minimizing, and offsetting GHG

331

BLM Statistics Website supra note 389 at Table 1 (listing total number of leases) and Table 2
(listing total acreage in effect).
332
BLM Statistics Website supra note 389 at Table 5 (listing total number of producing leases) and
Table 6 (listing total acreage of producing leases).
333
See Michael Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation for Fossil Fuel Extraction on Federal Lands,
42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 295, 316-322 (2017) [hereinafter Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation]
(discussing BLM’s statutory authority and duty to implement mitigation measures and
characterizing it as “beyond question”).
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emissions. With this approach, the BLM could require that all new oil and gas
development activity achieves net zero emissions.
Mitigation authority under FLPMA stems from the BLM’s obligation to
balance multiple resources, avoid permanent impairment, and the prevent unnecessary
or undue degradation.334 This statutory mitigation authority infuses the BLM’s
regulations, which authorize the BLM to set standards that avoid impairment of other
resources.335
In addition to FLPMA, NEPA’s plain statutory language and the BLM’s
NEPA-related implementing regulations also impose a duty to consider alternatives
that mitigate adverse impacts of a proposed action.336 DOI NEPA regulations require
that every proposed action include an analysis of “any appropriate mitigation measures
or best management practices that are considered.”337 The mitigation measures “can
be analyzed either as elements of alternatives or in a separate discussion of
mitigation.”338 Although NEPA is frequently characterized as a purely procedural
statute, the process of disclosure creates an opportunity to determine whether
reasonable mitigation measures have been overlooked. Paired with the BLM’s duty to
avoid permanent impairment of resources and the mandate to prevent unnecessary or
undue degradation, the NEPA process could reveal circumstances where the BLM
334

See supra Section III.A; see, e.g., Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D.D.C.
Nov. 18, 2003) (“FLPMA, by its plain terms, vests the Secretary of the Interior with the authority—
indeed the obligation—to disapprove of an otherwise permissible mining operation because the
operation, though necessary for mining, would unduly harm or degrade the public land.”); Jessica
Wilkinson et al., Solid Ground: Using Mitigation to Achieve Greater Predictability, Faster Project
Approval and Better Conservation Outcomes, 49 E.L.R 10028, 10033-35 (Jan. 2019) (listing
authorities).
335
See Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation supra note 316 at 316-20; see generally Justin Pidot,
Compensatory Mitigation and Public Lands, 61 B.C.L. REV. 1046 (Mar. 2020) [hereinafter Pidot,
Compensatory Mitigation] (articulating sources of BLM’s authority to require compensatory
mitigation).
336
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii); see generally Jamison E. Colburn, The Risk in Discretion: Substantive
NEPA’s Significance, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2016) (arguing for a substantive interpretation of
NEPA). See also 85 Fed. Reg. at 43360, to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(e) (requiring that
EISs “[i]nclude appropriate mitigation measures not already included in the proposed action or
alternatives.”).
337
43 C.F.R. § 46.130(a).
338
Id.
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failed to incorporate mitigation measures into the permitting process, contrary to its
statutory duties under FLPMA.339
Additionally, under the Mineral Leasing Act, the BLM has broad discretion to
determine what lands may be leased for oil and gas development.340 That discretion
encompasses authority to decide not to lease lands, as well as authority to define
operational limitations on all leasing activities.341 Since at least 2008, the BLM has
recognized that its authority to identify and implement mitigation measures (both
onsite and offsite of mineral development leases) arises out of FLPMA and the
authority to regulate public land uses.342
Specific to onshore oil and gas leases, the BLM has regulatory authority under
the MLA “to require that all operations be conducted in a manner which protects other
natural resources and the environmental quality.”343 Emphasizing this authority, oil
and gas leasing regulations also impose a duty on operators to comply with mitigationfocused restrictions. Operators must conduct “all operations in a manner . . . [that]
protects other natural resources and environmental quality; which protects life and
property.”344 Additionally, operators “shall conduct operations in a manner which
protects the mineral resources, other natural resources, and environmental quality.”345
339

Moreover, because the regulatory requirement to include mitigation and best management
practices in the NEPA analysis arises out of the Department of Interior’s implementing regulations,
it is unaffected by the proposed regulatory changes to the CEQ’s implementing regulations.
340
30 U.S.C. § 226(a).
341
John D. Leshy, Interior’s Authority to Curb Fossil Fuel Leasing, 49 ELR 10631 (July 2019); see
discussion infra at Section V. A & C.
342
Bureau of Land Mgmt., Offsite Mitigation, Instruction Memorandum No. 2008-204 (Sept. 30,
2008), Attachment 1-1 (“The BLM’s authority to address the mitigation of impacts on public lands
associated with a use authorization issued by the BLM derives from the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA). Additional authority can be found in the statutes governing specific
uses of the public lands such as the Mineral Leasing Act. The congressional declaration of policy
for FLPMA states that ‘the public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of
scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and
archeological values. . . .” FLPMA § 102(A)(8). In addition, the use, occupancy, and development
of public lands must be regulated by the Secretary through easements, permits, leases, licenses, or
other instruments.” FLPMA § 302(b)); Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation supra note 316 at 319320.
343
43 C.F.R. § 3161.2 (2019).
344
43 C.F.R. § 3162.1(a) (2019).
345
43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1(a) (2019).
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These regulations are consistent with the BLM’s statutory duty under FLPMA that “in
managing the public lands the [BLM] shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action
necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”346
In addition to the statutory sources of authority listed above, the BLM also has
contractual authority to impose mitigation measures on oil and gas lessees. The plain
language of the Standard Lease Form puts every lessee on notice that the right to drill
for oil and gas on federal land is subject to the duty to minimize adverse impacts, even
if those impacts are not contemplated at the time of the lease sale.347 Section 6 of the
Lease, which addresses Conduct of Operations, states, “Lessee must conduct
operations in a manner that minimizes adverse impacts to the land, air, and water, to
cultural, biological, visual, and other resources, and to other land uses or users.”348
Lessees must also “take reasonable measures deemed necessary by the lessor to
accomplish the intent of this section.”349 Those measures can be identified after the
lease sale, when the applicant applies to drill. “Prior to disturbing the surface of the
leased lands,” the lessee must notify the lessor “to be apprised of procedures to be
followed and modifications or reclamation measures that may be necessary.”350
Finally, Section 6 also puts lessees on notice that operations may be restricted, or even
ceased for environmental reasons.351 Thus, the plain language of the standard lease
form notifies each lessee that in addition to any pre-existing stipulations, the BLM

346

43 U.S.C. §1732(b).
Form 3100-11 at 3, Sec. 6. These contractual provisions are consistent with the BLM regulations.
43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1(a) (2019) (“The operator shall conduct operations in a manner which protects
. . . natural resources and environmental quality.”); see also id. § 3152.5-1(b) (“The operator shall
exercise due care and diligence to assure that lease hold operations do not result in undue damage
to surface or subsurface resources.”); 43 C.F.R. §3101.1-2 (“A lessee shall have the right to use so
much of the leased lands as is necessary to explore for, drill for, mine, extract, remove and dispose
of all the leased resource in a leasehold subject to: Stipulations attached to the lease; restrictions
deriving from specific, nondiscretionary statutes; and such reasonable measures as may be required
by the authorized officer to minimize adverse impacts to other resource values, land uses or users
not addressed in the lease stipulations at the time operations are proposed.”).
348
Form 3100-11 at 3, Sec. 6.
349
Id.
350
Id.
351
Id. (notifying lessee that operations may be restricted or ceased if “threatened or endangered
species, objects of historic or scientific interest, or substantial unanticipated environmental effects”
are observed in the conduct of operations).
347
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reserves contractual authority to impose additional mitigation and reclamation
measures after the lease is signed and when the lessee applies to drill.
In summary, the BLM has the statutory, regulatory, and contractual authority
and obligation to regulate mineral leasing operations in a manner that protects
environmental quality. That authority includes the ability to impose mitigation
measures as necessary to protect other asset values protected by the multiple use and
sustained yield standard imposed by FLPMA.352
C.

Arguments that the BLM cannot impose compensatory mitigation
measures are procedurally irregular, inconsistent with precedent,
and contrary to the statutory duties imposed by FLPMA.

Before delving into the BLM’s authority to impose a net zero standard in the
context of oil and gas development, it is necessary to distinguish between legal
authority and the BLM’s current policy. This section first provides history regarding
the BLM’s current stance rejecting compensatory mitigation, which is set forth in
Instruction Memorandum (IM 2018-093) entitled Compensatory Mitigation.353 The
second part of this section summarizes the legal arguments against the BLM’s current
stance.

352

See supra Section III.
IM 2018-93 supra note 84. This was later replaced by IM 2019-018 without substantive changes.
For simplicity and consistency with other analytical discussions of the memo, this discussion uses
the original title.
353
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1.

The History of the BLM’s Current Stance Rejecting
Compensatory Mitigation in IM 2018-093.

The Trump Administration’s approach to climate change was to ignore it,354
and the BLM embraced this policy.355 On March 28, 2017, Executive Order 13783,
Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, rescinded all executive orders
related to climate change and instructed all agencies to “suspend, revise, or rescind”
any action undertaken in compliance with the rescinded energy and climate-related
presidential regulatory actions.356 In addition to revoking Presidential Actions,
Executive Order 13783 also rescinded climate related reports including “The
President’s Climate Action Plan” and the “Climate Action Strategy to Reduce Methane
Emissions.” The order provided no factual justification for the rescissions, no
alternative climate related reports, and provided no replacement strategy for
responding to climate change. It simply reversed course and wished away climate
change.
In response to Executive Order 13783, the Department of Interior issued
several Secretarial Orders, including Secretarial Order 3349, American Energy
Independence, which instructed all departments to undertake a “Mitigation Policy
Review” and a “Climate Change Policy Review” as well as a review of “Other

354

See, e.g., Chris Baynes, Trump Administration Removes All Climate Change References from
Government Websites The Independent (Thursday, July 25, 2019) (discussing report that analyzed
more than 5,300 pages of 23 federal agencies and found a 25 percent reduction in usage of terms
“climate change, “clean energy” and “adaptation.”); Eric Nost et al, The New Digital Landscape:
How the Trump Administration Undermined Federal Web Infrastructures for Climate Information,
Environmental Data Governance Initiative (July 2019) available at https://envirodatagov.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/New_Digital_Landscape_EDGI_July_2019.pdf. See also Environmental
Data & Governance Initiative, Website Monitoring (providing ongoing analysis and reports of
changes to federal agency websites that restrict access to climate-related information).
355
See Andrew Bergman, Gretchen Gehrke, Toly Rinbert, and Justin Schell, Removal of Climate
Change Webpage from and Shift in Language on the Bureau of Land Management’s Website,
Environmental Data & Governance Initiative Website Monitoring Report (Jan. 9, 2018)
(documenting changes to BLM’s website that eliminate references to climate change) available at
https://envirodatagov.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WM-CCR-21-DOI-BLM-Website180109.pdf.
356
E.O. 13783, Energy Independence supra note 11.
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Department Actions Impacting Energy Development.”357 The BLM responded with
zeal. The results were published in October, “Final Report: Review of the Department
of the Interior Actions that Potentially Burden Domestic Energy,” which listed all of
the climate-related actions that the BLM either intended to or had already reversed.358
In addition to revoking and halting all climate-related programs, Secretarial
Order 3349 also took aim at mitigation practices. After revoking Secretarial Order
3330, “Improving Mitigation Policies and Practices of the Department of the
Interior,”359 it directed agencies to review all actions taken pursuant to that order for
possible reconsideration, modification, or rescission.360 Next, Secretarial Order No.
3360 rescinded BLM Manual Section 174- Mitigation (Dec. 22, 2016) and BLM
Mitigation Handbook H-1794-1.361
In response, the Deputy Director for Policy and Programs in the BLM (Brian
Steed) issued a department wide Instruction Memorandum (IM 2018-093) entitled
Compensatory Mitigation.362 IM 2018-093 took the highly unusual and unprecedented
position that “the BLM must not require compensatory mitigation from public land
users.”363 It juxtaposed this unusual interpretation with a statement that, “[i]n all
357

U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Secretarial Order 3349 American Energy Independence (Mar. 29, 2017)
[hereinafter S.O. 3349 American Energy Independence]
358
DOI, Report of Actions that Potentially Burden Energy supra note 84.
359
Secretarial Order 3330 had been adopted to establish a department-wide mitigation strategy that
ensured consistency, efficiency, and durability in mitigation practices. One of the purposes of S.O.
3330 was to facilitate the use of a landscape-scale approach to land use decisions and to “focus on
mitigation efforts that improve the resilience of our Nation’s resources in the face of climate
change.” Secretarial Order 3330, Improving Mitigation Policies and Practices of the Department
of the Interior, Sec. 1 (Oct. 31, 2013).
360
S.O. 3349 supra note 301 at 2.
361
Secretarial Order No. 3360 Rescinding Authorities Inconsistent with Secretary’s Order 3349,
“American Energy Independence” (Dec. 22, 2017). This order also rescinded two Departmental
Manuals, including Part 523, Chapter 1: Climate Change Policy (Dec. 20, 2012); Part 600, Chapter
6: Landscape-Scale Mitigation Policy (Oct. 23, 2015).
362
IM 2018-93 supra note 84. This was later replaced by IM 2019-018 without substantive changes.
For simplicity and consistency with other analytical discussions of the memo, this discussion uses
the original title.
363
Id. at 1. Ironically, the Background section of Secretarial Order 3360 discussed the role of
compensatory mitigation in a positive light, even though IM 2018-093 decried it as unauthorized.
“Implemented properly and appropriately, compensatory mitigation can be an appropriate tool used
to reduce or offset impacts from specific actions. . . . The Department recognizes the appropriateness
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instances, the BLM must refrain from authorizing any activity that causes unnecessary
or undue degradation.”364 Notwithstanding this duty, the memo announced that any
compensatory mitigation must be proposed by a project proponent and must be
voluntary. “To ensure compensatory mitigation is voluntary, the BLM must not
explicitly or implicitly suggest that project approval is contingent upon proposing a
‘voluntary’ compensatory mitigation component or that doing so would reverse or
avoid an adverse finding.”365 The IM’s sparse legal analysis relied on Executive Order
13783, Secretarial Order 3349, and Secretarial Order 3360 as justification.366 Without
discussing the statutory language of FLPMA, the existing regulatory structure, or case
law, the Instruction Memorandum took the unsupported position that “While FLPMA
in some instances may be interpreted to authorize various forms of the mitigation
hierarchy, such as avoidance and minimization, it cannot reasonably be read to allow
BLM to require mandatory compensatory mitigation for potential temporary or
permanent impacts from activities authorized on public lands.”367
2.

IM 2018-093 is not legally binding and does not deserve
deference because it is contrary to precedent and the
statutory language of FLPMA.

The BLM’s retreat from mitigation has been harshly criticized, and rightfully
so. The inventive interpretations set forth in IM 2018-093 are not legally binding and
do not deserve deference.368 First, the Department of the Interior has clearly stated that
instruction memorandums “do not have the force and effect of law.”369 Second, IM
of compensatory mitigation in certain instances and the role it serves in the legal use and
management of public lands under the jurisdiction of the Department.”
364
Id.
365
Id. at 2.
366
Id. at 3.
367
Id. at 3.
368
Pidot, The BLM’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation Policy supra note 93 at 1, 18 (detailing the
procedural irregularity of issuing such a sweeping change of legal interpretation through an
instruction memorandum issued by an acting director, where a change in legal interpretation would
normally be issued by the Solicitor in an M-Opinion).
369
Robert S. Glenn & DeLoyd Cazier, 124 Interior Dec. 104, 109 (IBLA 1992) (noting that although
agency employees are bound to follow agency manuals, “Instruction Memoranda and BLM Manual
Provisions do not have the force and effect of law and are not binding on either this Board or the
public at large.” (quoting Pamela S. Crocker-Davis, 94 IBLA 328, 332 (1986)); see McMaster v.
United States, 731 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Robert S. Glen).
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2018-093 cannot impose a “binding norm” because it was not adopted through notice
and comment rulemaking. Third, the legal interpretation set forth in IM 2018-093
finds no support in the words or structure of FLPMA.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency must generally use notice
and comment procedures to make a rule.370 Without following this procedure,
statements of policy must leave officials “free to consider the individual facts of the
various cases that arise.”371 Because IM 2018-093 was not adopted through the
appropriate rulemaking procedures, it does not have the force of law and cannot restrict
officials within the BLM from utilizing compensatory mitigation as a tool to achieve
the multiple use balance.
The interpretation provided in IM 2018-93 also ignores precedent and jettisons
years of hard work. Creative solutions to avoiding degradation have frequently been
implemented by the BLM through compensatory mitigation. For example, in 1988, to
conserve the desert tortoise, the BLM adopted a “no net loss” standard to govern
compensatory mitigation for activities within the habitat of an unlisted species.372
More recently, compensatory mitigation measures were incorporated by the BLM in
the Desert Renewables Energy Conservation Plan (guiding the development of
alternative energy resources in California), and the BLM’s commitment to
implementing compensatory mitigation measures to address impacts to the greater
sage-grouse provided justification for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife’s decision not to “list”
the greater sage-grouse as a threatened or endangered species.373 Each of these
programs relied upon compensatory mitigation to achieve the BLM’s multiple use
mandate.
370

5 U.S.C. § 553; Western Watersheds Project v. Zinke, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1233 (D. Mont.
2018).
371
Western Watersheds Project, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1233-1234 (quoting Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick,
813 F. 2d 1006, 1012-14 (9th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
372
See Bureau of Land Mgmt., Desert Tortoise Mgmt. Oversight Grp., Final Report: Compensation
for the Desert Tortoise 1 (1991) https://tortoise.org/conservation/hastey1991.pdf
373
See generally Bureau of Land Mgmt., Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan: Land Use
Plan
Amendment
(2016)
https://eplanning.blm.gov/eplfrontoffice/projects/lup/66459/133474/163144/DRECP_BLM_LUPA.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B7A3PJU]; See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Finding on a Petition to List
Greater Sage-Grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus) as Endangered or Threatened Species, 80 Fed.
Reg. 59,858, 59,880 (Oct. 2, 2015).
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Moreover, the rejection of compensatory mitigation finds no support in the
words or the structure of FLPMA. “The implausibility of Congress’s leaving a highly
significant issue unaddressed . . . is assuredly one of the factors to be considered.”374
If Congress had meant to preclude compensatory mitigation, it would have said so.
Instead, Congress granted the BLM a vast and challenging task without imposing
specific limitations on the tools that the BLM could use.375 Even the definition of
multiple use grants broad leeway to the BLM to make “the most judicious use of the
land for some or all of these resources or related services over areas large enough to
provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs
and conditions.”376 Additionally, in the development and revision of land use plans,
the BLM shall “consider the relative scarcity of the values involved and the availability
of alternative means . . . and sites for realization of those values.”377 It is illogical that
Congress would have assigned such a large task in such broad terms, with such wide
authority, but then silently restricted the BLM from finding creative ways to strike the
right balance by offsetting harms through compensatory mitigation.378 In other words,
Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”379
In summary, the BLM’s current policy rejecting compensatory mitigation lacks
the force of law, jettisons decades of precedent, and contradicts a reasonable statutory
interpretation.380 Because it represents a policy choice, not a legal boundary of the
BLM’s authority, it should not detract from an informed discussion of the BLM’s legal
authority to require mitigation of GHG emissions.
374

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 547, 468-69 (2000)
See, e.g. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(12), (8) (instructing the BLM to balance multiple uses that include
recognition of “the Nation’s need for domestic sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber from
public lands” with the responsibility to manage those lands “in a manner that will protect the quality
of scientific, scenic, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and
archeological values”).
376
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c).
377
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(7).
378
See Pidot, Compensatory Mitigation supra note 318 at 1088-1089 (noting that when Congress
enacted FLPMA, compensatory mitigation was a familiar land use planning tool for municipal
planners and that the term “land use planning” was a term of art with general usage that incorporated
the body of learning from which it was taken).
379
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 468.
380
Pidot, Compensatory Mitigation supra note 318 at 1062. See generally Pidot, The Bureau of
Land Management’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation Policy, supra note 93.
375
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VI.

Ways to Incorporate GHG Mitigation at Each Stage of the Oil and Gas
Development Process.

Oil and gas leasing decisions occur in three stages: (1) land use planning; (2)
leasing; and (3) Application to Drill (APD) approval. Each stage triggers NEPA, and
the BLM has authority to mitigate adverse environmental impacts at each stage.381 By
identifying GHG emissions as an adverse impact of oil and gas development, the BLM
could use its existing regulatory authority to require that all new oil and gas
development activity include a mitigation strategy for achieving net zero emissions.
A.

Land Use Planning: New data regarding climate change provide
changed circumstances that justify revising land use plans to
include a net zero stipulation on all new oil and gas leases.

Oil and gas development decisions begin with land use planning and
preparation of a resource management plan (“RMP”). Land use planning is an ongoing
statutory duty imposed on the BLM through FLPMA.382 RMPs define allowable uses
across a broad landscape that often exceeds a million acres or more, defining the
desired future conditions for that landscape and the resources it contains.383 This
includes identifying which areas will be open to future oil and gas leasing and the land
use stipulations that will apply to those lands. Creating and revising an RMP is a major
federal action that requires a NEPA analysis, which includes consideration of climate
change.384 The planning process (aided by NEPA) must “use and observe the principles
of multiple use and sustained yield.”385

381

See New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmnt, 565 F.3d 683, 716 (10th Cir.
2009); Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Int., 377 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2004);
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1255 (D. Utah 2006).
382
43 U.S.C. § 1732(a).
383
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1255 (D. Utah 2006).
384
43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6; 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-5(a), (b).
385
These principles include the obligation to “rely, to the extent that it is available, on the inventory
of the public lands, their resources, and other values”; “use a systematic interdisciplinary approach”;
“give priority to the designation and protection of areas of critical environmental concern”; “weigh
long term benefits to the public against short-term benefits;” “provide for compliance with
applicable pollution control laws;” and coordinate the land use inventory, planning, and
management activities with the programs of other Federal departments and agencies and states,
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Congress anticipated that RMPs would, and should, change with the needs of
future generations.386 When appropriate, BLM has a duty to revise land use plans.387
BLM regulations state that RMPs “shall” be amended when new information, such as
monitoring and evaluation findings, new data, or a change in circumstances becomes
available.388
The BLM has already acknowledged that these statutory principles impose a
responsibility on the agency to consider climate change as it relates to mineral
development. Referring to coal, the BLM stated, “Consideration of the implications of
Federal coal leasing for climate change, as an extensively documented threat to the
health and welfare of the American people, falls squarely within the factors to be
considered in determining the public interest.’”389 This statement is equally applicable
to other fossil fuels, including oil and gas. The BLM also recognized that the
information related to climate change “is critical in the development of land use plans
where the Secretary must ‘weigh the long-term benefits to the public against short-term
benefits.”390
Since the BLM made those statements acknowledging the urgency of climate
change, new reports have added additional urgency. For example, the IPCC Special
Report emphasizing the importance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C and myriad
scientific studies associated with that report have been released. With many BLM
plans dating to the 1980s and 1990s,391 current climate science reports constitute new
local, and tribal governments. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(4); Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n, 624 F.3d at 1096-97;
Squillace, Rethinking Public Land Use Planning, supra note 185 at 429.
386
43 U.S.C. §§ 1711(a) (the inventory upon which plans are based “shall be kept current so as to
reflect changes in conditions”); and 1712(c)(4) (plans “shall . . . rely, to the extent it is available on
the inventory of the public lands, their resources, and other values.”).
387
43 USC § 1712(a) (BLM must “develop, maintain, and, when appropriate revise land plans.”);
Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. BLM, 624 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010); SUWA, 542 U.S. at 58-60
(describing the land use process).
388
43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-5 (“An amendment shall be initiated by the need to consider monitoring and
evaluating findings, new data, new or revised policy, a change in circumstances, or a proposed action
that may result in a change in the scope of resource uses or a change in the terms, conditions, and
decisions of the approved plan.”).
389
BLM, Federal Coal Program PEIS Scoping Report supra note 82 at ES-2.
390
Id.
391
See e.g., Bureau of Land Management, Utah Planning and NEPA, Plans in Effect,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/planning-and-nepa/plans-in-development/utah (last visited May 27,
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data and a change in circumstances warranting a reassessment of land use decisions.392
With this justification, the land use plan revision process could be used to update or
implement generally applicable land use requirements and lease stipulations that better
account for GHG emissions and climate change.393
More specifically, the BLM could amend existing land use plans to adopt a
stipulation that would apply to all new oil and gas leases. Such a stipulation could
impose GHG mitigation measures requiring that all new oil and gas leases achieve net
zero emissions. As the BLM recognized in the coal program Scoping Report, a net
zero requirement could be achieved by requiring the lessee to carry out or fund
activities that proportionally offset emissions.394 “This approach has been used under
the Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act as an efficient way to provide
appropriate and measurable benefits to a resource that has been negatively affected
through a proposed action.”395
Potential methods of achieving net zero emissions are diverse. As a small,
illustrative example, the lessee could implement methane reduction strategies such as
plugging abandoned and orphaned wells sufficient to offset the anticipated CO2e
emissions quantified during the NEPA process. So long as the methane reduction
strategies implemented would not otherwise be required by law, the reduction in GHGs
could be used to offset the emissions from the new well. The potential GHG reductions
that can be achieved by plugging abandoned and orphaned wells are significant. The
2020) (identifying plans in effect that date to 1980 and fifteen plans within Utah that are more than
twenty years old). See also, Bureau of Land Management, New Mexico Planning and NEPA, Plans
in Effect, https://www.blm.gov/programs/planning-and-nepa/plans-in-development/new-mexico
(identifying plans in effect that date to 1986 and nine plans that are more than twenty years old).
392
43 U.S.C. §1712(c)(7).
393
For example, in order to implement procedures that would protect the greater sage grouse, the
BLM revised or amended 98 land management plans to adopt sage grouse protections across the
bird’s range in ten Western states. To ensure that the mitigation measures incorporated into the land
use plans were implemented consistently, the BLM issued an Instructional Memorandum detailing
implementation. See Mont. Wildlife Fed’n v. Bernhart, CV-18-69-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 90571, *6-8 (D. Mont. May 22, 2020).
394
BLM, Federal Coal Program PEIS Scoping Report supra note 82 at 6-17 (“Alternatively, under
this option, the BLM could approve transactions proposed by lessees that would achieve the desired
outcome of compensatory mitigation, but for which projects were carried out by private businesses,
non-profits, or state or local agencies.”).
395
Id.
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EPA estimates that methane emitted from abandoned oil and gas wells was responsible
for 7 MMT of CO2e emissions, and that abandoned underground coal mines produced
an additional 6.2 MMTs of CO2e emissions in 2018.396 These emissions provide no
benefit to society, but still exacerbate climate change. Leak reduction at unabandoned
facilities may provide an additional opportunity. Alternatively, a lessee could offset
emissions through investment in carbon sink strategies verified by a third party. Or a
company could offset emissions by transitioning to an electric vehicle fleet. Although
there are still challenges to be worked out, a market already exists to utilize third party
providers who verify and manage net zero commitments.397
Individually revising every RMP to incorporate climate data would be
painstakingly slow. Fortunately, that is not necessary because NEPA provides a
procedural mechanism for analyzing this type of programmatic change. The most
efficient way to implement a GHG mitigation strategy (applicable to all new oil and
gas leasing decisions) would be to initiate a Programmatic EIS (“PEIS”) considering a
nationwide strategy and identifying standardized, predictable ways of implementing
and phasing in a net zero emission standard on all new oil and gas leasing.398
Conducting a nationwide PEIS would enable the BLM to accurately assess the
reasonably foreseeable impacts from oil and gas development combined with other
fossil fuel development activities nationally and globally. It would also allow the BLM
to incorporate the most recent scientific observations regarding climate change, which
indicate that every incremental increase in GHG emissions is significant in order to
limit warming to 1.5°C.399 Moreover, a national PEIS is appropriate because climate
change is a global problem. GHGs emitted regionally affect the whole nation equally.
396

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fast Facts 1990-2018 National-Level U.S. Greenhouse
Gas Inventory https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-04/documents/fastfacts-19902018.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2020).
397
See generally., Michael A Mehling, Governing Cooperative Approaches under the Paris
Agreement, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 765 (2019).
398
White House Council on Envtl. Quality, Effective Use of Programmatic NEPA Reviews 10 (2014)
https://perma.cc/93PR-JTUJ (“A well-crafted programmatic NEPA review provides the basis for
decisions to approve such broad or high-level decisions such as identifying geographically bounded
areas within which future proposed activities can be taken or identifying broad mitigation and
conservation measures that can be applied to subsequent tiered reviews.”
399
Id. (“One advantage of preparing a programmatic NEPA review for repetitive agency activities
is that the programmatic NEPA review can provide a starting point for analyzing direct, indirect,
and cumulative impacts.”).
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In summary, the BLM has authority to impose a net zero mitigation
requirement on all new oil and gas development through its ongoing statutory duty to
update land use plans where new data or changed circumstances justify revision. The
overwhelming scientific consensus regarding the urgency of reducing emissions
constitutes changed circumstances that justify such a revision. The BLM could
advance the substantive goals contained in FLPMA through the NEPA process,
programmatically evaluating options to achieve net zero emissions.
B.

Leasing: Even without amending RMP’s, the BLM can impose a
net zero mitigation requirement as a stipulation attached to all new
leases.

The second stage of oil and gas development occurs when the BLM offers
specific parcels of land for lease sale through a competitive or non-competitive bidding
process.400 At the leasing stage, the BLM may include stipulations set forth in the RMP
or attach new stipulations.401 The leasing process tiers to the applicable RMP while
affording an opportunity to take a closer look at specific areas and likely developments.
A closer look may be necessary because RMPs can cover millions of acres and lack
the resolution required to address discrete resources in specific areas.
Leasing decisions require a NEPA analysis because they represent an
“irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources.”402 Even if an RMP
400

Bruce Pendery, BLM’s Retained Rights: How Requiring Environmental Protection Fulfills Oil
and Gas Leasing Obligations, 40 Envtl. L. 599, 607-08 (Spring 2010) [hereinafter Pendery, BLM’s
Retained Rights].
401
43 C.F.R. § 3101.1-3 (“The authorized officer may require stipulations as conditions of lease
issuance. Stipulations shall become part of the lease and shall supersede inconsistent provisions of
the standard lease form.”).
402
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 562 F.2d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 1977)) (holding that issuing an oil and gas
lease without a no surface occupancy stipulation represents an irreversible and irretrievable
commitment of resources, which requires compliance with NEPA); See also Pendery, BLM’s
Retained Rights supra note 401 at 609 and Part VII.D (discussing cases). However, some courts
have accepted agency arguments that the environmental impacts at this stage are too speculative for
a NEPA analysis. See, e.g., WildEarth v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 310 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Projects in
their infancy have uncertain futures, and thus, it would be unreasonable to require BLM to consider
every proposed lease from its analysis of foreseeable future actions.” (quoting Theodore Roosevelt
Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
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authorizes a particular land use, the site-specific NEPA analysis provides an
opportunity to assess whether the assumptions supporting the RMP decision remain
valid, and whether there are additional or new site-specific considerations that may
have a significant effect on the environment. The pre-leasing NEPA process may
identify mitigation measures based on site-specific limitations or in response to
monitoring and evaluation results that are part of an adaptive management strategy.403
Mitigation measures developed during the pre-leasing NEPA process may be
incorporated as lease stipulations and published prior to the lease sale.404 Because the
lease is a contract, the BLM has broad authority to define the terms of the contract prior
to sale.405
Stipulations have been used in a wide variety of contexts to adjust the standard
lease terms to avoid adverse effects related to energy development. A 2008 study
conducted under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act found that of the 128 Federal
land use plans surveyed, there were approximately 3,125 individual stipulations in
place.406 The study reported that the reviewed stipulations “serve many purposes,
ranging from the protection of environmental, social, historical, or cultural resources
or values to the payment of rentals and royalties.”407
Rather than amending RMPs to require a net zero lease stipulation, the BLM
could use its regulatory authority over mineral lease operations to impose a standard
stipulation that would apply nationally to all new leases. As discussed above, initiating
a PEIS would provide an appropriate procedural mechanism for implementing this
approach. Alternatively, the BLM could impose stipulations on a lease-by-lease basis.
While a lease-by-lease approach would increase flexibility, it would also increase the
403

43 C.F.R. § 46.145 (directing Interior Bureaus to use “adaptive management” as part of the NEPA
process, especially “in circumstances where long-term impacts may be uncertain and future
monitoring will be needed to make adjustments in subsequent implementation decisions.”
404
43 U.S.C. § 3101.1-3 (“Any party submitting a bid . . . shall be deemed to have agreed to
stipulations applicable to the specific parcel.”).
405
Pendery, BLM’s Retained Rights supra note 401 at 642; Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation
supra note 316 at 319-321.
406
U.S. Dept. of Interior et al., Inventory of Onshore Federal Oil and Natural Gas Resources and
Restrictions
to
their
Development
(2008)
available
at
https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/EPCA_III_Inventory_Onshore_Federal_Oil_Gas.pdf
[hereinafter BLM 2008 EPCA Inventory].
407
Id.
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burden posed by project-specific NEPA analyses, reduce certainty for oil and gas
operators, and increase the risk of inconsistent stipulations between leases.
C.

APD Approval: The BLM can require GHG mitigation through
Conditions of Approval and Best Management Practices.

At the third stage, the lessee submits an Application for a Permit to Drill
(“APD”), which is a site-specific drilling and reclamation plan that the BLM must
approve before operations can commence. Consistent with the plain language of the
standard lease form, the “Lessee must conduct operations in a manner that minimizes
adverse impacts to the land, air, and water, to cultural, biological, visual, and other
resources, and to other land uses or users.”408 As the Lessor, the BLM retains extensive
authority to require that mitigation measures, best practices, and other “reasonable
measures deemed necessary” be incorporated into the drilling plan as a Condition of
Approval (“COA”) for the APD.409
The BLM has used this authority to incorporate best practices and mitigation
measures as part of the drilling plan, even if those practices were not anticipated at the
time of the lease sale.410 For example, a 2008 study summarized: “Older leases issued
before the effective date of the relevant plans may not be subject to stipulations from
the current land use planning document. It is reasonable, however, to consider the plan
stipulations as applicable. Environmental conditions that necessitate stipulations are
often the driver for COAs that are attached to the drilling permits on older leases”411
The BLM report goes on to explain that COAs enable the surface managing agency to
achieve the necessary environmental protection, even at the APD stage,412 listing

408

United States Dep’t. of Interior, Form 3100-11, Offer to Lease and Lease for Oil and Gas
(October 2008).
409
Id. § 6; see also infra Section VI. C.
410
Yates Petroleum Inc. 176 IBLA 144, 154 (2008) (upholding mitigation measures imposed as
COAs that were more stringent than standards in the RMP); BLM Surface Operating Standards and
Guidelines for Oil and Gas Exploration and Development: The Gold Book § 2.3 (4th ed. 2007)
(“Constraints may result from lease stipulations, the surface management agency’s review and
environmental analysis of the proposed operations, Notices to Lessees, Onshore Orders, or
regulations.”).
411
BLM 2008 EPCA Inventory supra note 351 at 12.
412
Id. at 12.
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multiple adverse effects that may be mitigated through COAs including air quality
impacts, visual impacts, noise, and suburban encroachment.413
A lessee challenging mitigation measures imposed as a COA at the APD stage
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that BLM’s opinion requiring the
mitigation measures is erroneous.414 This standard affords the BLM considerable
discretion to impose mitigation measures at the APD stage based on the best available
scientific evidence. For example, in Yates Petroleum, the lessee challenged mitigation
measures that were more stringent than those set forth in the RMP, as well as the
BLM’s decision to deny permits for five wells.415 In upholding the BLM’s decisions,
the Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”) emphasized the BLM’s regulatory and
statutory authority to minimize adverse impacts on other resource values.416 The court
reminded Yates that “A lessee’s right to use the leased lands is subject to ‘such
reasonable measures as may be required by the authorized officer to minimize adverse
impacts to other resource values, land uses, or users not addressed in the lease
stipulations at the time operations are proposed.’”417 Applying this standard, the Board
gave deference to the BLM’s imposition of mitigation measures and denial of APDs as
“reasonable measures required by the authorized officer to minimize adverse impacts
to a resource value not addressed in the lease stipulations at the time operations were

413

Id.
Yates Petroleum Inc. 176 IBLA 144, 154 (2008); see also Grynberg Petroleum, 152 IBLA 300,
307 (2000) (holding that a lessee challenging a remedial requirement imposed as a Condition of
Approval at the plugging and abandonment stage must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that such a requirement is excessive.”)
415
Id.
416
Id. at 155 (“The Secretary has general statutory authority to condition post-lease approvals in
accordance with section 17(g) of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended by section 5102(g)
of the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987 (FOOGLRA), 30 U.S.C. §
226(g)(2000)(determine actions required ‘in the interest of conservation of the surface resources’),
section 302(a) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §
1732(a)(2000) (manage the public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield, in
accordance with land use plans), and section 301(b) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b)(2000) (“take
any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”).
417
Yates Petroleum Inc. 176 IBLA at 155. (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 3101.1-2 and citing 43 C.F.R.
3162.5-1).
414
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proposed.”418 The imposition of mitigation to address GHG emissions is equally
reasonable and enforceable.
Additionally, the IBLA requires the BLM to incorporate new science into
mitigation measures on oil and gas leases even where the RMP has not yet been revised.
For example, in Maycock, Powder River Basin Resource Council, Biodiversity
Conservation Alliance, the IBLA set aside the approval of 82 APDs and remanded the
decision to the BLM for reconsideration of scientific studies showing that the sage
grouse mitigation measures identified in the RMP were “not as effective as BLM
contemplated they would be.”419 Since the issuance of the RMP in 2001, scientific
studies showed that assumptions made in the RMP, regarding sage grouse brooding
behavior were inaccurate.420 Although the EA acknowledged the studies, the BLM
relied upon the mitigation measures identified in the RMP instead of imposing more
stringent mitigation measures consistent with the new science.421 The IBLA found that
the BLM’s reliance on the default mitigation measures prescribed in the RMP and the
Powder River Basin EIS was arbitrary and capricious.422 Additionally, the Board found
no reason for the BLM to rely on the existing RMP and FEIS until further research
could be accomplished.423 Declining to defer to the BLM’s discretion, the IBLA
pointed out that there was no “difference of opinion among experts” where all the
“more recent scientific studies uniformly indicate that the current measures are less
effective than BLM believed they would be.”424 In a related case, the IBLA upheld the
BLM’s authority to impose more stringent mitigation measures than identified in the
RMP and the FEIS based on the results of the new research.425 The Maycock holding
418

Id.; see also Grynberg Petroleum, 152 IBLA at 307.
Maycock, Powder River Basin Resource Council, Biodiversity Conservation Alliance, 177 IBLA
1, 16, 28 (Mar. 16, 2009).
420
Id. at 16-17.
421
Id. at 17.
422
Id. at 18 (“It is contradictory for the BLM to rely solely on those mitigation measures in issuing
an EA and FONSI at the same time that it acknowledges the validity of more recent research that
demonstrates that those mitigation measures are not as effective as originally anticipated.”).
423
Id. at 19 (“Nor can BLM avoid the problem by purporting to rely on the 1985 Buffalo RMP and
the 2003 PRB FEIS and ROD until further research can provide a more accurate answer regarding
the appropriate distance between disruptive activities and sage grouse lek and nesting and broodrearing areas. . . . BLM has not shown any ‘conflicting’ scientific research.”).
424
Id.
425
Yates Petroelum Corp., 176 IBLA 144 (Sept. 30, 2008).
419
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is particularly relevant to climate change, where there is also no difference of opinion
among experts. All recent scientific studies uniformly indicate that increasing GHG
emissions will exacerbate climate change and result in resource degradation
unanticipated by most RMPs. Accordingly, relying on existing RMPs to avoid the
imposition of GHG mitigation measures at the APD stage is potentially arbitrary and
capricious and contrary to the BLM’s statutory duty to prevent permanent impairment
while balancing multiple uses. Requiring existing lessees to mitigate their impacts to
the atmosphere and climate therefore fits squarely within the BLM’s existing authority.
1.

Using NEPA at the APD stage to implement GHG
mitigation requirements.

The NEPA process, which is triggered at the APD stage, can provide a forum
to identify and justify the reasonableness of mitigation measures as Conditions of
Approval, and the opportunity afforded by NEPA should not be avoided.426 If the
appropriate analysis has been done earlier, this final and most granular level of NEPA
review is often handled through a Categorical Exclusion that tiers to the RMP and
leasing analysis.427 If the earlier analysis avoided a meaningful assessment of GHG
emissions and climate change impacts, further analysis may be required. According to
BLM regulations, “Before approving any Application for Permit to Drill . . . [the BLM]
shall prepare an environmental record of review or an environmental assessment as
appropriate. These environmental documents will be used in determining whether or
not an environmental impact statement is required and in determining any appropriate
terms and conditions of approval of the submitted plan.”428 Moreover, under the DOI’s
regulations, “any action that is normally categorically excluded must be evaluated to
determine any of the extraordinary circumstances in section 46.215; if it does, further
analysis and environmental documents must be prepared.”429 Among the twelve
categories of defined extraordinary circumstances are actions that “have a direct
relationship to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant
environmental effects.”430 Thus, even though APD applications may be numerous,
they still require a meaningful environmental assessment under BLM regulations.
426

43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1(a) (2019).
See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
428
43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1(a) (2019).
429
43 C.F.R. § 46.205(c)(1) (2019).
430
43 C.F.R. § 46.215(f) (2019).
427
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Where the tiered document lacks an updated climate change assessment, a lack of
significant impact cannot be presumed.
Both industry and BLM often cite the BLM’s regulatory authority to impose
mitigation measures at the APD stage in order to avoid NEPA at the leasing stage.431
Especially where a climate change analysis was deferred until the APD stage, it
becomes necessary and appropriate to use the NEPA process at the APD stage to
explore cumulative effects and require mitigation. Otherwise, alternatives to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation caused by exacerbating climate change will have
been foreclosed without discussion. In a similar context, a federal court in Colorado
rejected the BLM’s claim that it was “too late” to analyze and mitigate GHG emissions
after having delayed a thorough NEPA analysis at an earlier stage of the leasing
process. “Under this reasoning, it could theoretically reward agencies for skirting
NEPA requirements in prior stages of oil and gas development, which does not align
with the informed decision-making goals of NEPA.”432
In order to justify a deferred environmental analysis at the leasing stage, the
BLM itself has argued that it is not “too late” to impose stringent mitigation
requirement at the APD stage.433 For example, in a case before the Interior Board of
Land Appeals, a homeowners association challenged the BLM’s FONSI associated
with a lease sale.434 The homeowners argued that the BLM had not undertaken
431

See e.g., San Juan Citizens Alliance v. United States Bureau of Land Management, 326 F. Supp.
3d 1227 (D.N.M. 2018); see also Park County Res. Council Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 817 F.2d
609, 621-22 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that BLM was not required to address potential mitigation
measures of lease stipulations at the leasing stage because “[i]n order to work the lease, the lessee
must submit site-specific proposals to the Forest Service and BLM who can then modify those plans
to address any number of environmental considerations” and “each action is subject to continuing
review”) overruled on other grounds by Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d
970, 972 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
432
Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. U.S. BLM, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1237 (D. Colo 2019) (holding
that because downstream emissions were not considered at the leasing stage, the “earliest possible
time” mandated by NEPA required that they be considered at the MDP stage. “Since it did not
happen before, this stage of the development process would be the earliest possible time.”).
433
See, e.g., Duna Vista Resorts, 187 IBLA 43 (2016) (arguing that it was appropriate to issue a
FONSI at the leasing stage because the BLM had authority to mitigate all potential environmental
effects by imposing COAs at the APD stage, including dictating which formation the lessee could
drill into); see also BLM, EA for Sold Wyoming Leases supra note 66 at 26, 35.
434
Duna Vista Resorts, 187 IBLA 43 (2016).
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sufficient analysis to know whether it was safe to allow development of the oil and gas
resources to proceed upon issuance of the lease.435 Specifically, the homeowners
argued that the BLM had not sufficiently analyzed the risk of emitting hydrogen sulfide
gas, which had been released from several nearby wells.436 The BLM took the position
that it had ample authority to require mitigation at the APD stage, and that the reserved
authority would be sufficient to offset any potentially significant environmental effects.
The IBLA accepted the BLM’s argument that it appropriately deferred analysis of this
issue based on BLM’s authority to mitigate the risk at the APD stage by precluding the
lessees from recovering oil and gas from the problematic formation. “Further, were
BLM to determine that such effects were unacceptable, even given the imposition of
appropriate mitigation measures, it could, at that time, preclude the recovery of any oil
and gas from that formation.”437 In other words, the BLM itself argued that its authority
to impose mitigation measures at the APD stage is adequate to allow imposition of new
conditions sufficient to prevent environmental and public health injuries or even
preclude development from a particular formation entirely.
2.

The BLM has already imposed smaller GHG mitigation
measures at the APD stage, demonstrating its authority to
require more meaningful mitigation at this stage.

Existing practices demonstrate the BLM’s authority to require GHG mitigation
at the APD stage. BLM field offices have already imposed GHG mitigation through
Best Management Practices (BMPs) or Conditions of Approval (COAs) at the APD
stage. For example, the Colorado State Office in 2013 published a document
identifying BMPs related to emissions, including GHG emissions.438 The document
described the “process and strategies the BLM will use when authorizing activities that
have the potential to adversely impact air quality.”439 They began by recognizing that
435

Id at 46.
Id. at 50-51.
437
Id. at 51.
438
Colorado Bureau of Land Management, Comprehensive Air Resource Protection Protocol
(CARPP) (September 2013).
439
Id. at 3; see also COLORADO BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, COMPREHENSIVE AIR RESOURCE
PROTECTION PROTOCOL (CARPP) 9 (September 2013) [hereinafter CARPP Standards]
(“Appropriate emission reduction measures are best identified and required at the project
authorization stage, when the temporal and spatial characteristics and technological specifications
of the proposed action have been defined. The project-specific information available at that stage
436
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“The BLM has the authority and responsibility under [FLPMA] to manage public lands
in a manner that will protect the quality of air and atmospheric values.”440 To
accomplish this, “The BLM will request the proponent of an oil and gas development
activity . . . to submit a comprehensive inventory of anticipated direct and indirect
emissions . . . including fugitive emissions and greenhouse gas emissions.”441 Using
this inventory, where the project’s emissions are potentially significant, the operator’s
plans “shall include a detailed description of operator committed measures to reduce
project related pollutant emissions, including greenhouse gases.”442
The BLM recently reaffirmed its authority to mitigate GHG emissions at the
APD stage in response to a remand from the federal district court for the District of
Columbia. In WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, the court concluded that the “BLM failed
to take a ‘hard look’ at GHG emissions” arising from 283 parcels sold in a Wyoming
oil and gas lease sale.443 In response, the BLM conducted an EA “to comply with the
court’s decision.”444 In the EA, the BLM took the position that “The sale of parcels
and issuance of oil and gas leases is an administrative action, without direct impacts to
surface resources such as habitat, and water resources.”445 The BLM asserted that it
conducts additional documentation and technical analysis prior to issuing a permit for
site-specific lease operations.446 In other words, the BLM explicitly identified the APD
stage, rather than the lease stage, as the appropriate stage to impose GHG mitigation
strategies. Specific to mitigation of impacts from GHG emissions, the BLM 2019
Wyoming Lease Sale EA identified four sources of authority (and effective

allows for the development of an emissions inventory and impact analysis that can be used to
identify effective mitigation options for predicted adverse impacts.”).
440
Id.
441
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
442
Id. at 9.
443
368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 85 (D.D.C. 2019).
444
BLM, Supplemental Environmental Assessment for the May 2015 – August 2016 Sold and
Issued Leases DOI-BLM-WY-0000-2019-0007-EA 7 (2019) https://bit.ly/2D9ZYQo. [hereinafter
BLM, EA for Sold Wyoming Leases] (articulating the “purpose and need”).
445
Id. at 26.
446
Id.
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mechanisms) to mitigate GHG emissions at the APD stage: (1) COAs; 447 (2) BMPs;448
(3) applicant-committed measures; and (4) requirements incorporated into a state air
quality permit.449 Each one of these avenues could be utilized on other projects.
In summary, the BLM could impose a net zero requirement on existing leases
at the APD stage. Imposing this requirement would be consistent with scientific
consensus and would fulfill the BLM’s duty to avoid permanent impairment of other
resources. The NEPA process can be used to provide further justification for the
reasonableness of imposing a net zero requirement at the APD stage. Moreover, it is
not too late to impose mitigation measures at the APD stage, especially where the BLM
and industry shortchanged the NEPA analysis at the leasing stage, promising to
evaluate mitigation measures at the APD stage. Finally, the BLM has already
acknowledged its authority to impose GHG mitigation measures as BMPS or as COAs
and it is not unreasonable to expand this practice to impose a standardized net zero
requirement that is applicable to all new oil and gas wells.
VII.

Conclusion: Requiring That All New Oil and Gas Activity Achieves Net
Zero GHG Emissions Is a Reasonable Operational Requirement and Net
Zero Policies Have Precedent.

Climate change is creating a “new normal” requiring a fundamental
reassessment of risks and asset management. Entrusted with managing roughly a
quarter billion acres of land surface and the rich resources those lands contain—range,
water, wildlife, timber, cultural resources, scenic and recreational resources, and more,
the BLM sits at the crossroads of this transition. Scientific consensus indicates that the
climate has already warmed 1°C, resulting in observed ecological and systemic
changes that caution against allowing warming to exceed 1.5°C. The current emissions
trajectory will exacerbate climate change, with forecasted warming of at least 3°C by
447

Id. (“Aside from the protection measures required under the lease stipulations or measures that
may be voluntarily committed to by a project proponent, additional measures may be required as
conditions of approval (COAs) attached to BLM’s authorization . . . based on technical and site
specific NEPA review.”).
448
Id. at 35 (“In carrying out its responsibilities, BLM has developed BMPs designed to reduce
emission from field production and operations. Analysis and approval of future development of the
lease parcels may include application of BMPs within BLM’s authority, as Conditions of Approval
(COAs) to reduce or mitigate GHG emissions.”).
449
Id. at 35 (explaining that additional GHG mitigation measures could be incorporated as
“applicant-committed measures” or “added to necessary State of Wyoming air quality permits.”).
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the end of the century. Reversing this trend and limiting global warming to 1.5°C
requires adhering to a carbon budget that will achieve a 45 percent decline in global
anthropogenic emissions by 2030 and reach net zero no later than 2050. At this late
stage in the game, every incremental increase in GHG emissions has cumulatively
significant environmental consequences.
Avoiding the irreversible and catastrophic results of warming above 1.5°C
requires immediate reductions in GHG emissions sufficient to achieve economy-wide
net zero emissions by 2050.450 In response to this scientifically derived prescription,
many countries and large corporations have already adopted a net zero target. BP Oil’s
CEO, Bernard Looney, declined to mince words. “Let me be very clear today. . . . The
world does have a carbon budget. It’s finite and it’s running out fast, and we need a
rapid transition to net-zero.”451 Other large emitters, like Duke Energy and Dominion
Energy, are also pledging to become net zero by 2050.452 Amazon has taken a
leadership role by pledging to be net zero by 2040, ten years in advance of the Paris
Accords.453 Similarly, the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis established
a goal of reaching net zero economy-wide by 2050.454 Additionally, the Biden-Harris
platform includes a commitment to “ensure the U.S. achieves a 100% clean energy
economy and reaches net zero emissions no later than 2050.”455 Adopting a net zero
mitigation standard for all new oil and gas development activity would be consistent
with these trends.
A net zero requirement would also fulfill the BLM’s responsibility to maximize
coordination of its land use plans with management programs of other federal

450

IPCC 1.5° Special Report, Summary for Policy Makers supra note 9 at 14.
Robert Perkins, BP Sets Target for ‘Net Zero’ Carbon Footprint by 2050 Platts Oilgram News
Vol. 98; No. 31 (Feb. 13, 2020).
452
Targeted News Service, Dominion Energy Sets New Goal of Net Zero Emissions by 2050
(Richmond, VA Feb. 12, 2020) (Thomas F. Farrell, II, chairman, president and CEO said, “Our
employees have always been problem-solvers in the work we do for our customers. I am confident
we can use this same mindset to help solve this challenge and leave the world a better place for
future generations.”).
453
Joanna G. Ramey, Jeff Bezos Details Amazon’s Net-Zero Carbon Emissions 2040 Goal Fortune
(Sept. 19, 2019) available at https://fortune.com/2019/09/19/jeff-bezos-details-amazons-net-zerocarbon-emissions-2040-goals-climate-change/ (last visited April 25, 2020).
454
House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, Climate Crisis Action Plan 3 (June 2020).
455
See https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ (last visited August 17, 2020).
451
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departments and agencies, and of the States and local governments.456 FLPMA
requires that the BLM coordinate land use planning and management “with the land
use planning and management activities . . . of the States and local governments within
which the lands are located,” and that the BLM’s “[l]and use plans . . . shall be
consistent with State and local plans to the maximum extent . . . consistent with Federal
law and the purposes of this act.” 457 The United States previously made a commitment,
consistent with scientific consensus, to significantly reduce emissions.458 Despite the
Trump Administration’s hostility to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change,459 several state and local municipalities have committed to uphold the
United States’ commitments under the Paris Accord.460 Twenty-five states have joined
the United States Climate Alliance, a bipartisan coalition of 25 governors committed
to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.461 The Climate Alliance recognizes
“that climate change presents a serious threat to the environment and our residents,
communities, and economies.”462 Alliance members are committed to “pursuing
aggressive climate action to make progress” toward the goals of the Paris
Agreement.463 Among the Alliance members are states with significant fossil fuel

456

43 U.S.C. § 1712(8), (9).
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9).
458
The United States submitted a plan to reduce economy-wide GHG emissions by 26-28% below
2005 levels by 2025, which would put the country on a trajectory to achieve emission reductions of
80% or more by 2050. See The White House, United States Mid-Century Strategy for Deep
Decarbonization (Nov. 2016); U.S. Cover Note, INDC and Accompanying Information, U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Mar. 31, 2015), available at
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20States%20
of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.
pdf
459
Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate Agreement New York Times (Nov.
4, 2019).
460
Julia Rosen, Cities, states and companies vow to meet U.S. Climate Goals without Trump. Can
They? LA Times (Nov. 4, 2019) (“More than 400 city leaders have joined the Climate Mayors
association and 25 states and territories have joined the U.S. Climate Alliance. Both organizations
have vowed to uphold the country’s Paris pledge.”).
461
See
United
States
Climate
Alliance,
Alliance
Principles
http://www.usclimatealliance.org/alliance-principles (last visited July 12, 2020).
462
Id.
463
Id.
457
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resources managed by the BLM, including Colorado, New Mexico, and Montana.464
In addition to these States, 446 Mayors, representing 71 million Americans, have also
committed to uphold the commitments and goals of the Paris Agreement.465 A net zero
requirement for new development would be consistent with the BLM’s statutory duty
to coordinate its land use decisions with these States’ commitments to address climate
change.
There is also substantial precedent for adopting a net zero policy, and for
including offsetting mitigation as a tool to achieve net zero emissions. For example,
on November 3, 2015, President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum directing
federal agencies to develop mitigation policies that “establish a net benefit goal or, at
a minimum, a no net loss goal for natural resources the agency manages that are
important, scarce, or sensitive, or wherever doing so is consistent with agency mission
and established natural resource objectives.”466 The Environmental Protection Agency
created the Net Zero Initiative to assist communities and the military in achieving Net
Zero goals in energy, waste, and water use.467 Through this initiative, the EPA has
signed Memorandums of Understanding with the U.S. Army and the Department of
Defense to advance the sustainability goals of achieving net zero energy, water, and
waste in military installations.468 A net zero policy is also consistent with the BLM’s
landscape-scale approach to mitigation and land use decisions and with policies
adopted by the BLM’s sister agencies within the Department of the Interior. For
example, the Fish and Wildlife Service explicitly adopted a “no net loss” strategy in its
464

See United States Climate Alliance, About Us http://www.usclimatealliance.org/about-us (listing
the following States as Alliance members: Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin).
465
Climate Mayors, Paris Climate Agreement http://climatemayors.org/actions/paris-climateagreement/ (publishing a Statement signed by 446 Mayors committing to increase efforts to cut
greenhouse gas emissions in order to meet the 1.5°C target).
466
Presidential Memorandum: Mitigating Impacts on Natural Resources from Development and
Encouraging Related Private Investment, 80 Fed. Reg. 68743 (Nov. 3, 2015), withdrawn by E.O.
13783 supra note 11.
467
See https://www.epa.gov/water-research/promoting-sustainability-through-net-zero-strategies
(providing the Mission Statement of EPA’s Net Zero Initiative) (site last visited August 17, 2020).
468
EPA, Net Zero Fact Sheet, Promoting Sustainability and Resilience through Net Zero and Net
Positive Technologies and Approaches (PDF) available at https://www.epa.gov/water-research/netzero-fact-sheet (last visited August 17, 2020).
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definition of landscape-scale mitigation.469 A no net loss has been applied to wetlands,
and that policy has remained in place for decades through multiple administrations,
Republican and Democrat alike.470 Thus, net zero policies have been successfully
incorporated into BLM policies and permitting decisions in the past. Adopting a net
zero requirement for all new oil and gas development activity would be consistent with
scientific consensus regarding the urgency of climate change, and it would be in line
with policies adopted by other federal agencies responding to the risks of climate
change.
Within the existing legal framework, the BLM has authority to achieve net zero
emissions on all new oil and gas development activity, and it can do so by imposing
mitigation requirements at each stage of the development process. This approach
would be consistent with the BLM’s statutory duty to manage federal lands according
to a standard of care, with a multi-generation time horizon, and without permanent
impairment of the nation’s ecological resources, including the atmosphere. Continuing
to ignore climate change in its permitting decisions puts almost every resource under
the BLM’s care at risk and fails to recognize what Larry Fink cautioned investors:
“Climate risk is investment risk.”

469

81 Fed. Reg. 83440 (Nov. 21, 2016), withdrawn by 83 Fed. Reg. 36472 July 30, 2018 (adopting
a mitigation strategy that mitigation policy that “provides a framework for applying a landscapescale approach to achieve, through application of the mitigation hierarchy, a net gain in conservation
outcomes, or at a minimum, no net loss of resources and their values, services, and functions
resulting from proposed actions”)
470
See Remarks on Signing the North American Wetlands Conservation Act, Dec. 13, 1989, Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1989, 1699 (“In recognition of these functions and their
significance to the CWA, the goal of no net loss of wetland area and function was introduced at a
national wetland policy forum by the Conservation Foundation in 1988, endorsed by the federal
administration in 1990, and supported since.”); see also National Wetland Mitigation Action Plan,
Dec. 24, 2002 (adopted by G.W. Bush); See Clean Water Action Plan: Restoring and Protecting
America’s Waters, Feb. 14, 1998 (Clinton Administration pledged a net increase in wetlands); 104
Stat. 4761,4784; Pub. L. No. 101-646, the “Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and
Control Act of 1990” (Nov. 29, 1990) (included a no net loss of wetlands pledge); 104 Stat. 4604,
4635; Pub. L. No. 101-640, the “Water Resources Development Act” (Nov. 28, 1990) (included a
no net loss of wetlands pledge); Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) Clean Water Act Sections
404(b)(1) Guidelines; Correction 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (March 12, 1990) (developed at presidential
direction and including a no net loss of wetlands pledge).
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